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ARTICLES
A Revisionist History of Indian Country
JOSEPH D. MATAL*
This Article argues that tribal sovereignty is not purely a question
of federal intent, but rather also requires an affirmative cession of
jurisdiction by the state. The Article traces the history of the Indian country concept and concludes that the current statute was
never intented to create tribal sovereignty. It urges a return to the
historical two-step test: federal set-aside of land and subsequent
state consent. The Article contends that the use of the Indian
country statute to recognize sovereignty is recent, that it directly
conflicts with other United States Supreme Court standards for defining the scope of Indian government, and that it runs afoul of
principles of state sovereignty. The Article finds that under the
proper test, there is no tribal sovereignty in Alaska other than in
Metlakatla. It concludes that the Venetie cases are merely a
symptom of a current confusion in which the Indian sovereignty
doctrine is degenerating into one based solely on ancestry.

I. INTRODUCTION
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, “Indian country” was coterminous with tribal sovereignty. In the late nineteenth century, however, assimilationist policies began to extinguish tribal governments across the nation. Yet at the same time,
the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a set of federal protective laws that purported to apply to the “Indian country.” Had the Court continued to define Indian country in jurisdic-
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tional terms, it effectively would have repealed those statutes. Instead, in a series of early twentiethcentury decisions, the Supreme
Court severed the definition of Indian country from tribal sovereignty and decided that it exists wherever there is a dependent Indian community. It stopped defining Indian country in terms of
the exclusion of state law. These cases were codified in the federal
criminal statutes in 1948.
Recently, courts have begun applying the 1948 definition of
Indian country to recognize tribal sovereignty and preempt state
jurisdiction. They are using the twentieth century test, but giving it
a nineteenth century meaning. General confusion about Indian
law, abetted by an authoritative treatise in this area, has led the
courts to overlook critical changes made to the meaning of “Indian
country” at the beginning of this century.
While the initial results of this misunderstanding were unremarkable, that has begun to change. Last year, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals embarked on a course of recognizing land held
in fee by Native corporations in Alaska as sovereign Indian country. At issue is whether the state of Alaska has the right to apply
its laws to more than forty million acres within its borders. In No1
vember 1996, a three-judge panel took the first bite: the Venetie II
decision declares that 1.8 million acres held in fee by the Natives of
the Village of Venetie are part of a dependent Indian community,
and are thus sovereign to the exclusion of state law.
Alaska’s travails have their origins in the misadventures of
one Pete McGowan. In 1937, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a trial
court’s dismissal of a prosecution of McGowan on charges of in2
troducing liquor into Indian country. The court accepted that
McGowan had brought two bottles of whiskey to the Reno Indian
Colony. The court found, however, that the colony could not possibly be Indian country, because it was not “‘out of the jurisdiction
3
of any state.’” Since Nevada never had ceded its sovereignty over
4
the place, its jurisdiction remained “‘complete and perfect,’” and
the court could not “legislate and extend the criminal laws of the
United States over the farm sites under the guise that they are

1. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie (Venetie
II), 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). See generally Carey Goldberg, Tiny Tribe in Remote Arctic is Jolting Alaska, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1997, at A1.
2. See United States v. McGowan, 89 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1937), rev’d, 302
U.S. 535 (1938).
3. Id. (quoting People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819)).
4. Id. (quoting United States v. Pennsylvania, 48 F. 669, 670 (E.D. Va.
1880)).
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‘Indian country.’”5
The Supreme Court reversed.6 In doing so, however, it dismissed only the “therefore” in the court of appeals’ reasoning, not
the “because.” United States v. McGowan found that since the
Reno Colony was a “dependent Indian community,” it qualified as
7
“Indian country” for the purposes of federal protective legislation.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Indian
8
country designation would limit the application of state law. The
unanimous Court declared that its Indian country finding
does not deprive the state of Nevada of its sovereignty over the
area in question. The federal government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony. Enactments of the federal
government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the operation, within the colony, of such state laws as con9
flict with the federal enactments.

To establish its point, the McGowan Court cited two cases
which emphasize that a state’s laws apply throughout its borders
10
unless it voluntarily has surrendered its jurisdiction. The first,
11
Surplus Trading v. Cook, declares that absent an “affirmative cession of jurisdiction by the state, [a federal] reservation is part of
12
her territory and within the field of operation of her laws.” The
13
other, Hallowell v. United States, holds that even when an area
and its inhabitants are governed by state laws, the area can still be
14
Indian country for purposes of federal Indian legislation.
McGowan represents the culmination of more than one hundred years of efforts by the Supreme Court to draw the boundaries
of Indian country. Much of the federal protective legislation for
Indians applied only in “Indian country,” but Congress had not defined that term since 1834.15 Moreover, in the 1880s, the federal
government began to break up tribal holdings and subject Indians
16
to state law. In response, the Supreme Court abandoned the notion that Indian country means sovereignty, no longer limiting that
term to areas beyond the United States or to places where the
states had ceded their jurisdiction. Instead, the Court held there is
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
See id. at 538-39.
See id. at 539-40.
Id. at 539.
See id.
281 U.S. 647 (1930).
Id. at 651.
221 U.S. 317 (1911).
See id. at 324.
See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 180, 6 Stat. 581.
See infra Part II.B.3.
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Indian country wherever land has been set aside for Indians under
federal superintendence.17 This definition was codified in 1948 at
18 U.S.C. § 1151.
In recent years, courts across the country have begun applying
18 U.S.C. § 1151 to declare Indian communities beyond the reach
of state law, even when there has been no affirmative cession of ju18
risdiction by the state. Land outside of a reservation purchased
19
by a tribe from private parties has been declared Indian country.
Even individual housing projects have been adjudicated Indian
20
country. While many of these courts were faced only with the
application of federal laws, they all have assumed that the Indian
21
country designation also works an exclusion of state law.
Some courts, although seeing no alternative, have expressed
reservations about preempting all state authority on the sole basis
22
of 18 U.S.C. § 1151. However, the Ninth Circuit has embraced
this new misunderstanding, pressing it to its logical extreme. At
issue in last November’s Venetie II case was whether a tribal council could impose a $160,000 “Business Activities Tax” on the State
23
of Alaska for building a schoolhouse in the village. While the
court remanded the tax question, it had no difficulty concluding
that an area roughly the size of Delaware is a sovereign nation that

17. See McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539.
18. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
19. See Martine, 442 F.2d at 1023-24.
20. See, e.g., Driver, 945 F.2d at 1415; United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d
837, 842 (8th Cir. 1981) (affirming declaratory judgment that state had no jurisdiction over apartments); United States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156, 159-60 (D.S.D.
1979) (finding federal criminal jurisdiction over housing complex because it was a
“dependent Indian community”).
21. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908,
915, 922 (1st Cir. 1996) (considering applicability of state housing code and environmental laws); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding no state tax authority in statutory Indian country); Indian Country
U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he Indian country classification is the benchmark for approaching the allocation of federal, tribal
and state authority with respect to Indians and Indian lands.”).
22. See, e.g., Narragansett, 89 F.3d at 922 (hesitating to recognize tribal sovereignty “without any opportunity for involvement by the state”); Buzzard v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 992 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting concern over a
rule that would “remove land from state jurisdiction” without the state “having
any voice in the matter”).
23. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
(Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478
(1997).
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is beyond the reach of state law.24
Not only does Venetie II stand at odds with the fact that Con25
gress explicitly terminated the Venetie reservation in 1971, the
ruling also has the potential to disrupt seriously the enforcement of
state law throughout a sizeable area of Alaska. Approximately
forty-four million acres in the state are held by Native corporations
as a result of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
26
(“ANCSA”). The Ninth Circuit’s version of the “dependent Indian communities” test probably would allow almost all of this
land to qualify as Indian country.
However, while the Ninth Circuit’s new six-factor inquiry is
more liberal than the test being applied in other circuits, it is not a
radical departure. Rather, Venetie II represents the logical result
of using 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to create jurisdictional enclaves. By
reading into the Indian country statute an effect that was never intended, the courts have been able to retract Alaska’s sovereignty
over almost two million acres that only twenty-five years earlier
27
were placed under its authority by a federal enactment. Venetie II
demonstrates that when the test for tribal sovereignty is uncoupled
from any requirement of a federal-state agreement to cede jurisdiction, it will produce results that are totally at odds with congressional intent and that substantially interfere with states’ rights.
This Article argues that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was meant to define
only the scope of federal laws that apply to Indian country. It was
never intended to withdraw state authority or create zones of exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction. Nor could it do so: the
United States Constitution allows a state’s authority over its land
and people to be removed only with the state’s consent.
Part II recreates the history of the Indian country designation.
It provides an account different from that in the standard treatises,
describing how changes in policy and questions of federal power
have affected the way Indian country has been defined over the
years. During the early period, Indian country was a bright line
that meant exclusive tribal jurisdiction. As federal power over the
tribes grew, the United States continued to exclude state law from
Indian country for two reasons: to preserve tribal autonomy and to
allow the exercise of federal police powers. Both of these needs
were eliminated in the late nineteenth century. Shortly thereafter,
the Supreme Court stopped defining “Indian country” in terms of
24. See id. at 1302-03.
25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1994); see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 746 (Rennard Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson eds.,
Michie 1982) [hereinafter COHEN 1982].
27. See ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628.
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an absence of state jurisdiction.
Part III describes how the Supreme Court has recently lost
sight of the critical changes made to the definition of Indian country earlier in this century. It suggests the Court was probably misled by a leading treatise in this area, Felix Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law. It also contends that the use of 18 U.S.C. §
1151 to establish tribal sovereignty is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s reservation termination cases and the rule of Mon28
tana v. United States.
Part III then urges a return to the traditional standard for defining tribal sovereignty. It argues that the current test not only
misreads the statute and produces absurd results, but also violates
states’ rights. The Supreme Court has never repudiated the principle that Congress cannot unilaterally suspend a state’s jurisdiction over its territory or create a competing sovereign within its
borders. Indeed, recent decisions demonstrate the continuing vitality of these principles. Finally, Part IV applies the proper standard to the example of Alaska, and concludes there is no tribal
sovereignty in that state.
II. A HISTORY OF INDIAN COUNTRY
Indian sovereignty remains a reality today. Although tribal
enclaves are subject to federal regulation, they are presumptively
immune from state law, except where Congress has provided oth29
erwise. Moreover, as sovereigns that pre-exist the Constitution,
tribes are not subject to the Bill of Rights’ limitations on govern30
mental power. Although federal laws and Supreme Court decisions have whittled away tribal authority over the years, especially
with regard to non-Indians, the Court continues to uphold “‘the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
31
them.’” It is these powers of domestic self-government that In32
dian nations retain within tribal territory.

28. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
29. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959); see generally COHEN 1982,
supra note 26, at 241-42.
30. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). But see 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (1968) (applying most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights to the
tribes).
31. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980)
(quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
32. This Article contends that the “Indian country” described by 18 U.S.C. §
1151 does not preempt state jurisdiction, but rather denotes only the area of application for those federal statutes which by their terms apply to “Indian country.” To describe those zones where American Indian tribes exercise governmental authority over land and people, a different term is called for. These
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A. The Original Bright Line of Sovereignty
Until the mid-nineteenth century, Indian removal was the
primary feature of British and then American policy toward the
tribes. White settlers would purchase Indian lands and remove
tribes westward. There was no thought of integrating the tribes
into Anglo-American society. They were respected, indeed feared,
as separate nations whose territories defined a political border.
During this early period, there was no distinction between Indian
country and tribal territory.
The term “Indian country” first was officially employed in
King George’s Royal Proclamation of 1763, which drew a boundary line separating the lands of the Indians from those of the colo33
nists. The 1763 Proclamation was part of a general effort on the
part of the Crown to centralize control over Indian affairs. Until
then, each colony tended to pursue its own policy toward the
tribes. Great Britain, its own foothold in the Americas far from
certain, was keen on maintaining friendly relations with the na34
35
tives. At the time, Indians far outnumbered settlers, and the
French and Indian War of 1757-63 left no doubt that an alliance of
tribes and foreign powers could pose a serious threat to the colonies. By demarcating Indian country and controlling land transfers, the monarchy attempted to keep avaricious settlers from an36
The Indian country designation also
tagonizing the Indians.
jurisdictional enclaves, where all state law is generally preempted, shall herein be
referred to as “tribal territory.” It is here that Indian nations possess the prerogatives of a sovereign. In tribal territory, tribes have the right to tax, regulate, and
assess civil and criminal penalties.
33. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 57 n.60 (describing Royal Proclamation
of Oct. 7, 1763, of King George III); Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, No. F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *2 (D.
Alaska Aug. 2, 1995) (citing FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN
THE FORMATIVE YEARS 11 (1962)), rev’d, 101 F.3d 1286 (1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
34. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 53-57. Cohen quotes the following
statement from a mid-eighteenth century British Indian Commissioner:
“The importance of Indians is now generally known and understood. A
doubt remains not, that the prosperity of our colonies on the continent
will stand or fall with our interest and favor among them. While they
are our friends, they are the cheapest and strongest barrier for the protection of our settlements; when enemies, they are capable of ravaging in
their method of war, in spite of all we can do, to render these possessions
almost useless.”
Id. at 57 n.55 (quoting HAROLD EDWARD FEY & D’ARCY MCNICKLE, INDIANS
AND OTHER AMERICANS 53 (rev. ed. 1970)).
35. See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 40 (1947).
36. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 10
(2d ed. 1988).
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recognized the reality that areas beyond this border, though
claimed by Britain, were effectively beyond its control. This territory was ruled by sovereign Indian tribes; any colonist who ventured there was on his own.
After independence, the American government retained both
the Indian country concept and the centralized control that went
with it. The Constitution placed relations with the tribes firmly in
37
federal hands. The early United States was weak and vulnerable
and, like its British predecessor, sought to avoid warfare with the
38
Indians. Commercial intercourse, especially land transfers, were
39
strictly regulated. But the federal government made no effort to
40
govern the internal affairs of Indians within Indian country.
Rather, the government continued the colonial policy of purchas41
ing Indian real property and moving the tribes west. The Indian
country boundary followed the tribes.
42
The Indian Intercourse Act of 1796 included the first statu43
tory definition of Indian country. At that time, the line demarcating Indian country ran from present-day Cleveland down to and
along the Ohio River to the mouth of the Tennessee River, and
44
behind the Carolinas and through Georgia to the sea. Further
treaties and Indian removal soon rendered this description obsolete. In 1834, a new Indian Intercourse Act defined Indian country
as
all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, and not within any [s]tate[,] to which the Indian
45
title has not been extinguished.

37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power over Indian
commerce); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the executive power to make treaties
with tribes); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (affirming that
treaties with tribes are contemplated by the treaty power).
38. See CANBY, supra note 36, at 10.
39. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730 (requiring a license
to trade in Indian country, and otherwise barring land transfers); Act of Mar. 30,
1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (establishing Indian country boundaries); Act of July 22,
1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (requiring a license to trade with Indians and a public
treaty to validate sales of lands by Indians).
40. See Cohen, supra note 35, at 28.
41. See generally COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 78-92.
42. Act of May 17, 1796, ch. 30, § 1 Stat. 469.
43. See id.
44. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 206 (1877); COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at
29-30 n.31.
45. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729. In Bates, the Supreme
Court read a comma into the Act between the words “not within any State” and
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Continued land cessions and the creation of new states and
territories also rendered this definition obsolete. However, the
1834 Act was Congress’s last attempt to define Indian country until
1948. Yet, as the Supreme Court would note, “a large body of
laws” remained on the books that by their own terms were confined in their operation “to the Indian country, whatever that may
46
Judicial construction became a necessity. Jurisdictional
be.”
boundaries slipped away from their legislative anchor as the Supreme Court began to read into the 1834 Act “an adaptability to
the altered circumstances of what [must be regarded as] Indian
47
country.” The 1834 statutory definition was finally repealed in
1874 when the compilers of the Revised Statutes deleted it from
48
the U.S. Code. The meaning of “Indian country” was left entirely
in the hands of the courts.
While the borders of Indian country were constantly shifting
during this period, the meaning of the term remained fixed. As the
49
Supreme Court declared in the landmark Worcester v. Georgia
decision, within Indian country, Indian nations were “distinct, in50
Federal law contemplated
dependent political communities.”
“the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the
51
states.” In other words, tribal affairs within Indian country were
beyond the reach of any state’s laws.
Furthermore, while the federal government retained legislative authority over the tribes, it rarely exercised it. Statutes pertaining to Indian country regulated interaction between the tribes
52
and non-Indians. For the most part, they applied only at the borders of tribal territory, with internal Indian affairs left to the
53
tribes. Throughout this early era, Worcester’s description of Indian country remained accurate: the tribes were separate sovereigns, “having territorial boundaries, within which their authority
54
[was] exclusive.”
B. Toward Indian Country Without Sovereignty
Federal deference to Indian self-rule did not last. During the
“to which the Indian title has not been extinguished.” 95 U.S. at 207.
46. Bates, 95 U.S. at 207.
47. Id.
48. See 18 Stat. 1085, tit. 74 (1874) (deleting the definition of Indian Country
from REV. STAT. § 5596 (1873)); Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 557
(1912).
49. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
50. Id. at 559.
51. Id. at 557.
52. See generally COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 67 n.53.
53. See id. at 67-68.
54. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
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second half of the nineteenth century, tribal governments were reduced from unalloyed internal sovereigns to virtual nonentities.
The assault came on two fronts. First, tribal relations increasingly
were subjected to federal regulation. Within their domain, tribal
powers were displaced by federal authority, particularly with regard to criminal matters. Second, Indian nations were enveloped
by states. While tribal independence was preserved at first by excepting reservations from state jurisdiction, Congress soon came to
favor forcible assimilation of Indians into American society. Indians began to find themselves governed by state law.
These two trends soon came into conflict: how could federal
criminal laws apply to Indians within a state, when only states can
exercise a general police power within their domain? The Supreme Court struggled for a justification for the extension of the
“Indian country” statutes to state Indians. It eventually settled on
the existence of a general federal police power for Indian affairs.
Furthermore, in order to allow these laws to continue to apply to
Indians under state law, the Court severed the definition of
“Indian country” from tribal sovereignty and the exclusion of state
authority.
1. Early sources of federal power. In 1817, Congress made an
early incursion into the tribal domain. It enacted the first criminal
laws that applied to Indians as well as to non-Indians within Indian
55
country. The modern descendant of this law, the Indian Country
56
Crimes Act, is still in force today. The 1817 Act provided that
crimes between whites and Indians (but not intra-Indian crimes)
would be governed by the laws developed for enclaves of exclusive
57
federal jurisdiction.
Such enclaves exist pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 17
of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to
“exercise exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
58
be.” Generally used for military purposes, these reserves are beyond the reach of state law. When states consent to their creation,
they consent to a cession of jurisdiction over the area. An early
exposition, which became the standard view, was made by Justice
Story in a case he heard as a circuit judge. In United States v.

55. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383; FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 71 (1st ed. 1942) [hereinafter C OHEN 1942].
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994). This statute is also referred to as the General
Crimes Act. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 287 n.50.
57. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1, 3 Stat. 383, 383.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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59
Cornell, Story explained that the mere purchase of land within a
state by the federal government would not oust the state’s jurisdiction. Rather, the state must relinquish its authority either expressly or by implication, as when the state’s legislature gives its
60
consent to the purchase. When this occurs, the land “by the very
terms of the constitution ipso facto falls within the exclusive legislation of [C]ongress, and the state jurisdiction is completely
61
ousted.”
A concomitant of this exclusive federal jurisdiction is a general federal police power, allowing Congress to enact all laws a
62
state might adopt. Congress’s authority in these areas is broad by
necessity. State regulations cannot extend to them, but the need
for law and order remains. And since the state has voluntarily
ceded its sovereignty over the place, the exercise of a federal police power does not intrude upon states’ rights.
It took little imagination to extend these principles to federal
holdings beyond the United States. Areas newly added to the nation, such as the Louisiana purchase or the vast territory conquered in the Mexican-American war, also initially were outside
the jurisdiction of any state. When territorial governments were
established in these lands, it was done purely under federal law.
These governments “owe[d] all their powers to the statutes of the
United States,” and their authority could be “withdrawn, modified,
63
or repealed at any time by [C]ongress.” The Supreme Court accepted this exercise of federal power

not so much from the clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the
[t]erritory and other property of the United States, as from the
ownership of the country in which the [t]erritories are, and the
right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the [n]ational
64
[g]overnment, and can be found nowhere else.

This same principle, that Congress can exercise general police
powers in areas where no state authority exists, was employed to
justify the initial application of federal criminal laws to Indian

59. 25 F. Cas. 646 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819) (No. 14,867).
60. See id. at 648.
61. Id.; see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 653-54 (1930)
(quoting Cornell, 25 F. Cas. at 648); Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S.
525, 532, 537 (1885).
62. See Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. California Dep’t of Agric., 318 U.S. 285,
294 (1943) (stating that within federal enclaves, “Congress has the combined
powers of a general and a state government”).
63. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1886); see also Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885) (finding federal power over territories).
64. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380 (citing Murphy, 114 U.S. at 44).
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country.65 In United States v. Rogers, 66 the Supreme Court affirmed
the jurisdiction of a federal court to try a white man for murder
67
under the Indian Country Crimes Act. The crime was committed
68
“in that part of the Indian country west of the State of Arkansas.”
The Court duly noted that the area, while “a part of the territory of
the United States,” was “not within the limits of any particular
69
State.” Rogers relied on this fact to reject a challenge to federal
police authority within Indian country. The court held that “where
the country occupied by [Indians] is not within the limits of one of
the States, Congress may by law punish any offence committed
70
there.”
Rogers marks the original fount of federal authority for the
Indian country criminal laws of the nineteenth century. Congress
has a general police power, equivalent to that of the states, in any
place of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Because Indian country was
outside of the borders of the states, Congress could regulate there
as it did in the territories and the federal enclaves. In the absence
of competing state authority, federal power was ample.
2. Indian reservations as federal enclaves. This initial source
of authority, exclusive federal jurisdiction, soon was threatened by
the growth of the United States. When Rogers upheld the federal
Indian Country Crimes Act in 1846, the court could still describe
71
Indian country as “west of the state of Arkansas.” During the
first half of the nineteenth century, federal policy had been to
purchase the tribes’ lands and relocate Indians west of the
72
Indian
Mississippi and beyond the borders of existing states.
territory continually remained outside of the jurisdiction of any
state. Tribal autonomy was preserved, and federal authority
remained plenary.
The Mexican-American War of 1846-48 forced a change in
thinking. With California admitted to the Union and the nation’s
holdings now stretching all the way to the Pacific Ocean, it must
have become plain to policymakers that the tribes could not be

65. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1, 3 Stat. 383, 383.
66. 45 U.S. (6 How.) 567 (1846).
67. See id. at 573.
68. Id. at 567.
69. Id. at 571-72.
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id. at 567.
72. See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. Most removal, however, was accomplished through treaties. See generally COHEN 1982, supra note
26, at 78-92.
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removed forever west.73 At this time, the federal government initiated a new policy: rather than removing tribes, it began to settle
74
Indians on reservations within newly created states.
The reservation policy posed a significant challenge to both
tribal autonomy and federal authority. As the Georgia Cherokee
Nation’s troubles in the 1830s had made clear, inclusion of a tribe
within state borders would inevitably lead to conflicts with state
75
authorities. Furthermore, once the tribe was within the state’s jurisdiction, federal police powers could not be justified by an absence of state authority.
Congress’s solution to these problems was to make the new
Indian reservations enclaves of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In
1817, the criminal laws developed for federal enclaves first were
76
applied to Indian country. Now Congress took the analogy a step
further and, in order to preserve the special jurisdictional status of
tribal territory, began making Indian country itself into federal enclaves. The Constitution permits creation of such jurisdictional ex77
ceptions anywhere within a state if the state consents.
The usual method of obtaining state consent was to require a
cession of jurisdiction over Indian lands in the enabling act
78
authorizing the state’s admission to the Union. The state would
include in its constitution a clause authorizing exclusive federal ju79
risdiction over tribal territory.
State cessions of jurisdiction over Indian lands became routine
80
after mid-century. The post-1850 reservations were viewed as
fixed enclaves that would remain under federal authority for the
indefinite future. A focus on state cessions of jurisdiction became
a regular feature of Supreme Court jurisprudence: as more tribes
73. See, e.g., Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962).
74. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 124, 262.
75. See id. at 81-84.
76. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
78. See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 228 (1922).
79. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. 22 (The people of South Dakota “do agree and
declare that we forever disclaim all right and title” to lands within the state “held by
any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain . . . under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.”).
80. See, e.g., Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 1, 72 Stat.
339, 339; Arizona Statehood Act of 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 569; Kansas Statehood Act of 1861, ch. 20, 12 Stat. 126, 127; Montana Statehood Act of 1889, ch.
180, 25 Stat. 676, 677; New Mexico Statehood Act of 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557,
558-59; Oklahoma Statehood Act of 1906, ch. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267; Utah
Statehood Act of 1894, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107, 108; see also IDAHO CONST. of 1890,
art. 21, § 19; WYO. CONST. of 1890, art. 21, § 26.
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found themselves within the borders of a state, questions of federal
authority and tribal freedom from state regulation began to turn
on whether the state had ceded its sovereignty over the area in
question.81
It is notable that none of the state cession clauses describes
with any particularity the territory over which jurisdiction is surrendered, but rather the clauses speak loosely of “lands held by
82
Indians.” The Supreme Court, however, did not engage in a factbased inquiry into historical occupancy to define sovereign borders. It looked instead to whether treaties and other federal action
had reserved an area to Indians. In many cases, a promise had
been made to a tribe that its lands never would be included within
83
a state. It is these agreements, or any guarantee to a tribe of exclusive use and occupancy of the land, that would define the scope
of the state’s cession of sovereignty. The Supreme Court cases defining jurisdictional borders thus look to two factors: (1) state consent to a cession of authority and (2) the existence of a previous
84
treaty or reservation setting an area aside for Indians.
A late illustration of the importance of a previous reservation
of land for Indians and subsequent state cession is provided by
85
Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan and Organized Village of
86
Kake v. Egan. In these twin cases, the Supreme Court addressed
87
whether section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act barred the state
88
89
from enforcing its law against fish traps in Native areas. Section
4 provides that the United States retains “absolute jurisdiction and
control” over “lands or other property . . . the right or title to

81. See, e.g., Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 351 (1908) (concluding that
land upon which defendant purchased liquor was part of that ceded to the United
States and therefore subject to federal authority).
82. See, e.g., 12 Stat. at 127 (“rights of . . . property now pertaining to the Indians”); 25 Stat. at 627 (“all lands . . . owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes”); 28 Stat. at 108 (“all lands . . . owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes”); 34 Stat. at 267 (“rights of . . . property pertaining to the Indians”); 36
Stat. at 559 (“all lands . . . owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes”).
83. See, e.g., Act of May 6, 1828, art. 2, 7 Stat. 311, 311.
84. See, e.g., Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 555 (1912); Draper v.
United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242, 244 (1896); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,
559 (1883); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 738-41 (1866).
85. 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
86. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
87. Pub. L. No. 85-50, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958).
88. See Act of Apr. 17, 1959, § 1, 1959 Alaska Sess. Laws 103.
89. While the word “Indian” is used throughout this article, Alaska’s original
inhabitants are referred to as “Natives,” not out of an inconsistent political correctness, but because anthropologists have traditionally distinguished between
Eskimos, Aleuts, and Indians. See COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 401 & n.2.
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which may be held by any Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.”90 Because
section 4 speaks of exclusive federal jurisdiction over Native land
and property, the parties had assumed on appeal that the state’s
91
jurisdiction would turn on the existence of Native property rights.
The Alaska Supreme Court previously had upheld state jurisdic92
tion for both villages.
In unanimous decisions, the Supreme Court reversed in Met93
lakatla and affirmed in Kake. It held that Alaska could enforce
94
its laws in the latter village but not in the former. The Court re95
Instead, it looked to
jected the parties’ focus on ownership.
whether the lands at issue had been set aside for Natives by previ96
ous federal action. The Court began by noting that section 4 of
the Alaska Statehood Act is substantially similar to cessions made
97
in other states’ enabling acts. It concluded that the Alaska Act
98
should be read the same way.
In these cases, section 4 excluded Alaska’s authority over
Metlakatla but not Kake because only the former previously had
99
been set aside as an Indian reservation. Congress had created a
100
The
reservation for Metlakatla in 1891, but none for Kake.
Court found that the purpose of the state cession was only “to preserve the status quo,” and that outside of a reservation, Indians
101
were not exempted from state law. In effect, a state concession
to exclusive federal jurisdiction over “Indian lands” would be effective only in those areas that had been set aside by the federal
102
government.
The Supreme Court has also made clear that actual consent by
the state to exclusive federal jurisdiction is the essential prerequisite to the recognition of tribal sovereignty. In United States v.

90. 72 Stat. at 339.
91. See Kake, 369 U.S. at 67.
92. See Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 931 (Alaska
1961), vacated, 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
93. Compare Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 59 with Kake, 369 U.S. at 76.
94. See Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 59; Kake, 369 U.S. at 76.
95. See Kake, 369 U.S. at 67.
96. See id. at 67-71.
97. See id. at 67-68.
98. See id. at 67-68, 71; see also id. at 69-70 (Congress’s intent was to not
“make the Alaska situation any different from that prevailing in other States as to
state jurisdiction over Indian lands”) (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1163, at 15 (1957)).
99. See id. at 75.
100. See Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 48, 52; Kake, 369 U.S. at 62.
101. Kake, 369 U.S. at 65; accord Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 75.
102. See Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 527 (1885) (citing 14
Op. Att’y Gen. 33 (1872)).
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103

McBratney, the Court found that the same federal Indian country
criminal laws that had been applied to a white-on-white crime in
104
United States v. Rogers could not be applied to a similar crime on
an Indian reservation in Colorado because there had been no ju105
risdictional cession by the state.
What is striking about McBratney is what the Court found inadequate. The treaty at issue had promised the Ute tribe
“absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” of the reserva106
This is the type of language generally found to exclude
tion.
state law when a statehood act does make a cession. Furthermore,
the Colorado Territorial Act had provided for jurisdictional ces107
sion over the Ute reservation. Citing Rogers, the Court held that
if this exception had been kept in the Statehood Act, the indictment “might doubtless have been maintained” in the federal
108
court.
However, the Colorado state enabling act makes no such exception. The Court held that the state’s admission to the Union
“necessarily repeals the provisions of any prior statute, or of any
109
existing treaty, which are clearly inconsistent therewith.” In this
case, the absence of an exception for the Ute Reservation effectively repealed the treaty and the territorial act’s stipulation that
the Ute reservation would not be made part of a state. The Court
declared that in order for statehood legislation to preserve Congress’s “sole and exclusive jurisdiction over [a] reservation,” it
110
must do so “by express words.”
McBratney emphasizes that only a state can provide the consent necessary to create a jurisdictional enclave within its borders.111 By implication, nothing that is done before statehood remains effective if it was not reaffirmed in the statehood enabling
112
act. If a state has yet to come into existence, then it cannot have
113
consented to a jurisdictional cession. The territorial government

103. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
104. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
105. See McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
106. Id. at 622 (citing Treaty between the United States of America and the
Tabeguache, Muache, Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River, and Uintah
Bands of Ute Indians, Mar. 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619).
107. See id. at 623 (citing Colorado Territorial Act of 1861, ch. 59, 12 Stat. 172,
176).
108. Id. (citing Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 567).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 623-24.
111. See id. at 624.
112. See id. at 623.
113. See id.
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is not the state and cannot speak for it.114 Therefore, incipient
statehood terminates jurisdictional allocations in treaties, as well
as other federal territorial legislation, unless they are subsequently
115
affirmed by the state legislature. Only the consent of the state
116
makes a transfer of sovereignty effective.
The principles applied in McBratney were also recognized in
other contexts at the time. For example, in Van Brocklin v. Ten117
nessee, a state tax case not involving Indians, the Court declared
that “[u]pon the admission of a State into the Union, the State
doubtless acquires general jurisdiction, civil and criminal, for the
preservation of public order, and the protection of persons and
property, throughout its limits, except where it has ceded exclusive
118
jurisdiction to the United States.” Van Brocklin also noted that a
state’s admission to the Union abrogates previous territorial legis119
lation.
The principle that each state automatically acquires jurisdiction over all territory within its borders upon statehood is a feature
of what is generally referred to as the “equal footing doctrine.”
This rule guarantees new states “‘all the rights of dominion and
120
sovereignty which belonged to the original states,’” thus precluding the federal government from trading away a state’s prerogatives prior to its admission or otherwise compromising the
121
state’s authority.
One aspect of the equal footing doctrine guarantees new
122
states ownership of all navigable waters within their territory.
Control of waters that can be used for travel is understood to be a
123
Therefore, even when the federal govfeature of sovereignty.
ernment has transferred the land around such waters to other parties before the state’s admission, the state is presumed to own the
river bed or lake bed, and thus to have authority over traffic on the

114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
118. Id. at 167-68 (citing Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Doe v. Beebe,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 25 (1851); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471 (1850);
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); New Orleans v. United States, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836)).
119. See id. at 159 (citing Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850);
Permoli v. Municipality of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845)).
120. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 513 (1896) (quoting Escanaba Co. v.
City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 688 (1882)).
121. See id. at 512-14.
122. See id. at 512.
123. See id.
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water.124 The equal footing doctrine prevents subordination of new
states to existing states or the imposition of an inferior status upon
125
citizens of new states. The Constitution entitles each new state
126
to an equal role in the Union.
The Supreme Court’s Indian cases have been protective of
both equal footing and the federal relationship with the tribes.
States’ rights and the federal Indian power have been made to accommodate one another. As the court declared in Dick v. United
127
States, “[t]hese fundamental principles are of equal dignity, and
neither must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair the
128
other.” For the states, this had meant that when federal Indian
regulations are claimed to preempt state law, they are not
“construed as doing so, if, by any reasonable meaning, they can be
129
In Ward, the Court went so far as to hold
otherwise treated.”
that former treaty guarantees to Indians of hunting rights on federal land were abrogated by the admission of the state to the Un130
ion.
That case, however, represents the exception rather than the
rule. In the Indians’ favor, the Court generally has held that treaty
rights survive into statehood, regardless of state consent, when the
same rights could have been created by unilateral federal action
after statehood. In other words, the state’s admission to the Union
is presumed not to abrogate the provisions of a treaty if those provisions could be reimposed without the state’s consent.
As McBratney demonstrates, this principle will not allow a
131
treaty to work a wholesale exclusion of state law. On the other
hand, federal protective regulations generally are preserved. Treaties that bar the sale of liquor to Indians or within former reserva132
tions survive into statehood. So do guarantees of water rights to

124. See Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 93 (1857); Permoli, 49 U.S.
(3 How.) at 610; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 215 (1845).
125. See Ward, 163 U.S. at 512-14.
126. In many cases, express “equal footing” clauses were included in statehood
enabling acts; however, the Court has indicated that the doctrine does not depend
on them. The clauses are “merely declaratory of the general rule.” Id. at 511.
127. 208 U.S. 340 (1908).
128. Id. at 353.
129. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 244 (1896).
130. See Ward, 163 U.S. at 514. Ward was based on the strained rationale that
a state’s power to regulate hunting — even on federal land — is an “essential attribute of governmental existence.” Id. at 516.
131. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1881).
132. See Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1914); Dick v. United
States, 208 U.S. 340, 359 (1908); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S.
188, 197 (1876).
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tribes.133 And just nine years after Ward v. Race Horse was decided, the Supreme Court effectively overruled that case by hold134
ing that treaty fishing rights are not abrogated by statehood. The
Court’s approach has been to view treaty stipulations as amend135
Therefore, even after statehood, Inments to federal statutes.
dian treaties will survive “exclusively on the [f]ederal authority
136
over the subject-matter.” In other words, the treaty is viewed as
having become federal legislation, and the only question is whether
the resulting law is within Congress’s power.
Almost all of the above cases involved an equal footing argument, with the states contending that because there had been no
reservations in their statehood acts, previous treaties were necessarily abrogated. The Court’s response is best summed up in Johnson v. Gearlds:
But if the making of such a treaty after the admission of the
State is not inconsistent with the “equal footing” of that State
with the others — as, of course, it is not — it seems to us to result
that there is nothing in the effect of “equal footing” clauses to
operate as an implied repeal of such a treaty when previously es137
tablished.

The Supreme Court’s concept of Indian country went largely
untouched by the rapid expansion of the United States during the
first three decades following the middle of the nineteenth century.
Through the creation of enclaves, the federal government was able
to preserve tribal autonomy and its own police authority in Indian
138
That designation still drew a bright line in the early
country.
1880s, defining both the scope of the federal Indian criminal law
and the boundaries of state jurisdiction.
In 1883, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Crow Dog described
Indian country as all lands “to which the Indian title has not been
extinguished,” and which were either outside “the exterior geographical limits of a state” or “excepted from its jurisdiction . . . at
139
the time of its admission.” The Court surveyed the history of the
133. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
134. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382-84 (1905). Justice White,
the author of Ward, dissented in Winans. Cf. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962) (“Even where reserved by federal treaties, off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights have been held subject to state regulation.”) (citing
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Ward, 163 U.S. at 504).
135. See, e.g., Gearlds, 234 U.S. at 436.
136. 43 Gallons, 93 U.S. at 197; see also Dick, 208 U.S. at 358-59.
137. 234 U.S. at 439. Compare id. with The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616,
620-21 (1870) (reasoning that “a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held
valid if it be in violation of that instrument”).
138. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 560-62 (1883).
139. Id. at 561.
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United States’s relations with the tribes since the early century and
saw only continuity.140 Moreover, it found that the overriding ob141
jective of federal policy was to preserve tribal autonomy.
The question presented in Crow Dog was whether several
statutes and treaties had extended the federal criminal laws to in142
The Court held that
tra-Indian crimes in the Sioux territory.
crimes among Indians within Indian country are governed solely
143
It made clear that its ruling was motivated by a
by tribal law.
concern not to impose on the Indians “the restraints of an external
and unknown code,” or allow them to be judged “by a standard
made by others,” rather than “by the customs of their people . . .
144
[and] the law of their land.”
The Crow Dog Court examined the relevant Indian treaties
and federal statutes, and concluded that “it was the very purpose
of all these arrangements to introduce” among the Indians one of
“the highest and best” arts of civilized life — “that of self govern145
ment.” At this late date, the Supreme Court could still find that
the primary goal of federal Indian policy was guaranteeing tribal
sovereignty. Allowing relations between Indians “to be dealt with
by each tribe for itself, according to its local customs,” was “the
general policy of the government . . . from the beginning to the
146
present time.”
The Court spoke too soon. The fair weather of federal deference reported by Crow Dog turned out to be the calm before the
coming storm. Not only did the court fail to foresee an impending
change in federal policy, it failed to appreciate how its own ruling
would partly precipitate that change. Crow Dog was the last decision for three-quarters of a century to uphold the right of tribal Indians to be governed by their own laws. The next two sections of
this Article describe the new federal policy of forced assimilation
of the 1880s and how it eventually led to fundamental changes in
the Supreme Court’s understanding of Indian country.
3. Allotment and the federal wardship power. Two federal
policies had created a need to maintain Indian country as a
jurisdictional concept: federal criminal laws could be applied only
in areas of exclusive jurisdiction and tribal self-rule required
freedom from state law. Both of these needs were eliminated in

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See id. at 572.
See id. at 568-69.
See id. at 557, 571.
See id. at 572.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 572.
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the 1880s.
The first change in direction was touched off by Crow Dog itself. Crow Dog was convicted of murdering Spotted Tail, a Brule
Sioux. 147 The crime took place within the Sioux reservation, which
had been excepted from the jurisdiction of Dakota territorial
148
courts. The murder had been particularly brutal, but under Sioux
tribal law Crow Dog’s punishment would have been limited to a
149
requirement that he support Spotted Tail’s family.
While the reach of the federal criminal laws had not increased
much since 1817, the public’s interest in the affairs of Indians had.
When the Supreme Court dismissed Crow Dog’s federal conviction, a public outcry led to the passage of the Indian Major Crimes
150
Act. As its name suggests, that Act extends the federal criminal
151
laws to several major offenses among Indians. It brings prosecutions for murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and other serious
felonies into federal court. Intra-Indian crimes within tribal territory no longer were reserved to tribal jurisdiction.
The aspect of the Major Crimes Act that proved troubling to
the Supreme Court is that its reach is not restricted to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The Act extends federal jurisdiction to
Indian crimes on reservations, regardless of whether the reservation is under state authority; it is not limited to Indian lands over
152
which the state has ceded its sovereignty. As a result, some potential applications of the Act cannot be justified as exercises of
federal police authority in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Just such an application was presented to the Court one year
153
after the Act’s passage. In United States v. Kagama, the high
court was faced with the federal prosecution of an intra-Indian
154
murder occurring on the Hoopa Valley reservation in California.
The state had never ceded its jurisdiction over the area; indeed,
California had never given its consent to any federal Indian en155
claves. The Hoopa Valley reserve had been created by executive
order in 1876, twenty-six years after the state’s admission to the

147. See id. at 557.
148. See id. at 559.
149. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 339 n.67.
150. Id. at 68 n.8.
151. See Indian Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)) (commonly referred to as the Major Crimes
Act).
152. See id.
153. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
154. See id. at 375.
155. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 246 (1913); see also California
Statehood Act, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
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Union.156 The prosecution of Kagama was an assertion of federal
police power in an area under state authority.
The Kagama Court began by dismissing the United States’s
argument that the Major Crimes Act could be justified under the
Indian commerce clause. The court declared that the prosecution
of common-law offenses simply had no relation to the regulation
157
of commerce with Indian tribes, and thus no basis in that clause.
It discussed Rogers and other decisions allowing the exercise of
federal police authority in areas not within the jurisdiction of any
158
state. It noted that this line of authority could not accommodate
the Major Crimes Act, as the Act applied even to “crimes on res159
ervations lying within a State.”
The Court nevertheless upheld the Act.160 In doing so, it effectively recognized a federal police power over Indians. Kagama relied on the rationale that “Indian tribes are the wards of the na161
tion.” Specifically,
[t]hey are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness . . .
there arises [in the federal government] the duty of protection,
162
and with it the power.

The Kagama reasoning is not entirely divorced from the notion of exclusive jurisdiction as a basis for federal power. The
opinion suggests that Indians remain outside of the political communities of their states: they owe the state “no allegiance” and re163
ceive from it “no protection.” Their inability to participate in the
164
public life of their state — their “weakness and helplessness” —
justifies a broad federal wardship authority that fills a void left by
the state.
This aspect of Kagama has not survived. The federal government at the time of the decision already had begun to envision the
total incorporation of Indians into American society. As discussed

156. See Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 253.
157. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79.
158. See id. at 379-81 (citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885); United
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.
511, 542 (1828)).
159. Id. at 383.
160. See id. at 383-84.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 384.
164. Id.
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below, the year after Kagama was decided, Congress embarked on
a wholesale policy of breaking up tribal holdings and allotting land
to individual Indians. After a fixed period, Indians would be subjected to state law and granted citizenship.165 In 1924, Congress
made citizens of all Indians born within the territorial limits of the
166
Although these assimilationist policies were
United States.
never fully implemented, and were repealed in part in the 1930s,
they made it impossible for the Court to continue to assume that
Indians within the state would remain outside of its jurisdiction.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases soon established that Congress’s wardship power over Indians does not depend on an absence of state jurisdiction. The Kagama Court had been uncomfortable with the notion that the federal government could exercise
broad police powers in an area where its authority was not exclusive. However, as the Kagama decision aged, it became its own
source of authority for the powers it had upheld. The court’s concerns dissipated once it had a precedent allowing federal police
regulations outside an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
167
In United States v. Thomas, the court interpreted Kagama as
generally allowing federal protective legislation for Indians. The
court found that “independently of any question of [Indian] title,”
whenever the United States sets land apart for Indians, “whether
168
within a State or Territory,” it may exercise broad powers. The
federal government can “pass such laws . . . as may be necessary to
[protect] persons and property, and to punish all offenses commit169
ted against [Indians] or by them within such reservations.”
The Thomas decision still tied this federal wardship power to
land, limiting its exercise to areas set apart for Indians. Predictably, even this limit soon disappeared. The eventual rule is ex170
pressed by United States v. Ramsey, which declares that federal
police authority “continue[s] after the admission of the state . . . in
virtue of the long-settled rule that such Indians are wards of the
171
nation.” Furthermore, “Congress possesses the broad power of
legislating for the protection of the Indians wherever they may be

165. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354 (1994)).
166. See Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253; see generally
COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 151-57.
167. 151 U.S. 577 (1894).
168. Id. at 585.
169. Id.
170. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
171. Id. at 469 (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271 (1913);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
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within the territory of the United States.”172
The federal power for Indian affairs was now plenary. Congress could legislate for Indians as freely as it could exercise any of
its enumerated powers, without regard to state authority. Once
this wardship power was firmly in place, it was no longer necessary
to justify any of the federal Indian laws on grounds of an absence
of state jurisdiction.
As Kagama and its progeny eliminated the need to define Indian country as a jurisdictional enclave, other developments
threatened the very existence of such enclaves. The statute that
defines the next fifty years of federal Indian policy is the General
173
Allotment Act of 1887. That law authorized the President to al174
lot tribal lands to individual Indians in amounts of 160 acres.
Any land left over could be sold or opened up for white settle175
ment.
As the Supreme Court has described it, “[t]he objectives of
allotment were simple and clear cut: to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation of
176
Section 5 of the Allotment Act
Indians into society at large.”
provided that title to parcels allotted to Indians would be held in
trust by the United States for twenty-five years; any conveyance or
177
encumbrance made during this period was void. Section 6 provided that members of allotted tribes “shall have the benefit of and
be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Terri178
tory in which they may reside.”
179
In In re Heff, the Supreme Court held that section 6 of the
General Allotment Act of 1887 subjected individual Indians to
plenary state jurisdiction immediately upon receipt of an allot180
In response, Congress amended the Act to provide that
ment.
state jurisdiction did not attach until “the expiration of the trust
172. Id. at 471.
173. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-354 (1994)).
174. The amount was reduced to 80 acres for agricultural lands in 1891. See
Act of Feb. 23, 1891, ch. 383, § 2, 26 Stat. 794, 795.
175. See 24 Stat. at 389-90.
176. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992). See generally In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499
(1905).
177. See General Allotment Act of 1887, § 5, 24 Stat. at 389-90. For a general
discussion of the history and mechanics of the Act, see Yakima, 502 U.S. at 25455; COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 130-43.
178. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 254; see also General Allotment Act of 1887, § 6, 24
Stat. at 390.
179. 197 U.S. 488 (1905).
180. See id. at 502-03.
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period . . . when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by
patent in fee.”181 The 1906 amendments also authorized the Presi182
dent to extend the trust period on any allotment indefinitely.
The allotment policy came to be regarded as a failure and was
183
ended by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”). The
first three sections of that Act prohibited further allotment, extended existing trust periods indefinitely, and restored surplus
lands within a reservation that were still in federal hands to tribal
184
ownership. Section 16 of the IRA authorized tribal governments
185
to adopt constitutions for self-rule. The Supreme Court eventually recognized this reversal of policy and the survival of tribal sov186
ereignty in Williams v. Lee. That case reaffirmed not only “the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them,” but also that “[s]tates have no power to regulate the affairs
187
of Indians on a reservation.” Allotment was not the last word in
federal Indian policy.
However, the allotment policy colored an entire era of the
Supreme Court’s Indian country jurisprudence. During this era,
the Court came to assume that tribal governments were moribund,
if not extinct. Allotment was viewed as having “inaugurated [a]
188
policy of terminating . . . tribal existence and government.” Toward the end of this era, the Court no longer considered tribal
governments to exist, and it no longer viewed Indian lands as having unique jurisdictional status.
This perspective is manifested in Surplus Trading Co. v.
189
Cook, a case that is not about Indians but discusses their status.
The Court was presented with the question of whether a state
could tax a transaction occurring on a military base brought under
exclusive federal jurisdiction pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause
190
17 of the United States Constitution. The opinion discusses the
special jurisdictional status of federal enclaves, and is careful to
distinguish federal lands that are simply “set apart and used for

181. Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 325, 326 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 391 (1994)).
182. See id.
183. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
184. See id. at 984-85.
185. See id. at 987.
186. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
187. Id. at 220.
188. Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 684 (1912); see also United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246 (1896).
189. 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
190. See id. at 649-50.
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public purposes.”191 It notes that “[s]uch ownership and use without more do not withdraw the lands from the jurisdiction of the
192
State.” State laws still apply, except that they “cannot affect the
title of the United States or embarrass it in using the lands or inter193
fere with its right of disposal.”
Surplus Trading then states that “a typical illustration” of
lands that are set apart but remain under state authority is “the
usual Indian reservation.”194 It declares that Indian “reservations
are part of the State within which they lie and her laws, civil and
criminal, have the same force therein as elsewhere within her lim195
its,” except as preempted by federal law.
Prior to the enactment of the IRA, the Court not only saw Indian reservations as no different from other federal lands, but also
saw them as a typical example of areas that, while set apart by the
federal government, remain under state authority. The Court believed it to be settled that Indian reservations, as opposed to federal enclaves, are governed by state laws. How far the situation
had evolved from Ex parte Crow Dog, where Indian reservations
196
had fallen on the opposite side of this distinction.
Surplus Trading’s statements are only dicta, and no case of
this era ever held that all tribal sovereignty had been extinguished.
However, the assumption that tribal governments were no longer
in operation had an important influence on the Supreme Court’s
construction of “Indian country.” Kagama began to allow federal
police powers over Indians to be exercised outside of jurisdictional
197
enclaves at the same time that such enclaves were disappearing.
Yet there remained a series of federal protective laws whose application was tied to Indian country. The next section of this Article
details how the Supreme Court prevented these laws from being
swept away in a rising tide of state jurisdiction by disconnecting the
Indian country concept from tribal sovereignty.
4. The creation of non-sovereign Indian country.
The
meaning of “Indian country” did not change immediately after
allotment began. As early as 1896, the Supreme Court recognized
that the allotment policy “contemplated the gradual extinction of
198
Yet for some years, the
Indian reservations and Indian titles.”

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 651.
Id.
See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883).
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246 (1896).
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Court continued to insist that Indian country only existed in the
gaps in the state’s jurisdiction.
In 1908, the Court ventured that land that had come under
state authority could not be Indian country. Dick v. United States199
notes in dicta that the federal liquor statute “did not intend by the
words ‘Indian country’ to embrace any body of territory in which
. . . the jurisdiction of the [s]tate, for all purposes of government,
200
was full and complete.” Dick upheld the federal liquor prosecu201
tion at issue despite the presence of state jurisdiction. The Court
based its ruling on a treaty with the tribe that had extended the
202
federal liquor laws to the lands in question.
Similar scenarios were encountered a year later in United
203
204
States v. Celestine and United States v. Sutton. In both cases, the
Court did not challenge the assumption that allotments subjected
205
However, the Court held
to state law are not Indian country.
that so long as the trust period for an allotment has not expired,
206
state jurisdiction does not attach to Indian lands. Celestine and
Sutton establish an important precedent that gave effect to the
1906 amendments to the General Allotment Act of 1887: that state
207
law does not apply to allotments while they remain inalienable.
208
In both of these cases, the allotments were still held in trust. The
court thus was able to enforce the federal Indian country laws
without abandoning the notion that state jurisdiction and Indian
country are incompatible.
Indian country finally was divorced from the requirement of
209
an absence of state jurisdiction in Hallowell v. United States.
That case involved the federal prohibition on importation of liquor
210
into Indian country. Although the trust period on the allotment
in question had not expired, the Court assumed that the Indian allottee was “entitled to the benefit of the laws, civil and criminal, of
199. 208 U.S. 340 (1908).
200. Id. at 352 (citing Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561; Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204,
207-08 (1877)).
201. See id. at 359.
202. See id. at 352-53, 359.
203. 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
204. 215 U.S. 291 (1909).
205. See Celestine, 215 U.S. at 278; Sutton, 215 U.S. at 291.
206. See Celestine, 215 U.S. at 290-91; Sutton, 215 U.S. at 294-95.
207. See also United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 (1926) (jurisdictional
impact of both trust ownership and restrictions on alienation is the same); United
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916) (no “dissolution of the tribal relation”
while allotments are still in trust).
208. See Celestine, 215 U.S. at 284; Sutton, 215 U.S. at 292.
209. 221 U.S. 317 (1911).
210. See id. at 318.
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the State of Nebraska.”211 Hallowell thus is contrary to Celestine’s
ruling of two years earlier that state law does not attach to allotments before their trust period expires.
But despite its finding of state jurisdiction, Hallowell held that
212
The opinion focused
the area in question was Indian country.
only on the question of federal power, and did not draw attention
to the change it brought to the Indian country definition. However, in subsequent years, the court would cite Hallowell for the
proposition that “Indian country” does not require an absence of
213
state jurisdiction.
Hallowell’s construction was reaffirmed in Donnelly v. United
214
States. That case held that the federal criminal laws for Indian
country extend to a murder on an Indian reservation even if it is
215
under state jurisdiction. Donnelly made clear that there is no requirement that the United States “have sole and exclusive jurisdic216
tion over the Indian country.” The Court acknowledged that it
was modifying the meaning of that term, which was still employed
in the criminal and liquor laws, but had not been redefined by
217
Congress in eighty years. Sovereign tribal territory was quickly
disappearing as reservations across the nation were allotted and
subjected to state law. Had the Court continued to define Indian
country in jurisdictional terms, it effectively would have repealed
these statutes. There soon would have been no such “Indian country.”
The need to disconnect Indian country from sovereignty was
presented by the facts of Donnelly. The murder at issue had occurred on an extension that had been added to the Hoopa Valley
218
Reservation in California by an executive order in 1891. This is
the same reservation examined in Kagama, where the Court had
struggled with a rationale for federal police authority in the ab219
California never had
sence of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
made a jurisdictional cession over Indian lands, and in any event it
was beyond dispute that an executive order setting aside land
within a state did not divest the state of its jurisdiction.
In Kagama, federal criminal jurisdiction had been upheld under the Major Crimes Act, which applies to all crimes by Indians

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 322.
See id. at 324.
See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 & n.14 (1938).
228 U.S. 243 (1913).
See id. at 253-54.
Id. at 268.
See id. at 269.
See id. at 253.
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375 (1886).
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on reservations, regardless of state jurisdiction.220 However, in
Donnelly, although the victim was an Indian, the murder had been
221
committed by a white. The only possible basis for federal jurisdiction was the Indian Country Crimes Act, which since 1817 had
extended federal laws to all offenses in Indian country. Had the
Court continued to define Indian country as outside of any state’s
jurisdiction, the federal government would have been unable to
punish a white for murdering an Indian on a federal Indian reservation.
The Court opted to update the definition of Indian country. It
decided to consider “the changes which have taken place in our
situation, with a view of determining from time to time what must
be regarded as Indian country where it is spoken of in the stat222
utes.” Donnelly explicitly severed Indian country from original
Indian sovereignty. The Court declared that “the term cannot now
be confined to land formerly held by the Indians, and to which
223
their title remains unextinguished.”
Donnelly considered which Indians Congress intended to
bring within its laws, and what areas should fall within the protective sweep of Indian country. In a first step towards a new definition, the opinion determined that “nothing can more appropriately
be deemed ‘Indian country’ . . . than a tract of land that . . . is law224
fully set apart as an Indian reservation.” Today, Donnelly forms
the basis of subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
The Court’s next two Indian country decisions were also codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, but they are less interesting because they
only involved areas that remained under exclusive federal jurisdic225
tion. United States v. Pelican applied the Indian Country Crimes
Act to trust allotments. Reaffirming Celestine and Sutton, the
Court found it was “not open to controversy” that restricted allotments continue “under the jurisdiction and control of Congress for
226
all governmental purposes relating to . . . Indians.” Pelican noted
that federal authority to legislate for Indians is ample even within a
227
In other words, even if state law had atstate’s jurisdiction.
tached, Congress could still apply its criminal laws to the area.
“The present question then is not one of power, but whether it can
be said that the descriptive term ‘Indian country’ . . . is inadequate

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 383-84.
See Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 269 (citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883)).
Id.
Id.
232 U.S. 442 (1914).
Id. at 447; see also id. at 451.
See id. at 448 (citing Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317, 324 (1911)).
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to embrace these allotments.”228 Pelican only raised an issue of
statutory construction: does “Indian country” include allotments?
The Court decided that restricted allotments are still Indian
country; they “retain during the trust period a distinctively Indian
229
character.” Pelican thus adopted a definition of Indian country
that is coextensive with tribal territory. While they remain inal230
ienable, allotments are also beyond the reach of state law.
Therefore, restrictions on alienation determine both whether an
allotment is sovereign and whether it is “Indian country.” The
only real issue in Pelican was whether the court should allow a
checkerboard federal criminal jurisdiction over various allotments
within a former reservation. The Court decided that as impractical
231
as this may be, it is what Congress intended. So long as an allotment is in trust or its alienability remains restricted, it is Indian
232
country. Pelican forms the basis of subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. §
1151.
The other codified case from this period is United States v.
233
Sandoval. Here again, the Court was dealing only with land that
was outside of any state’s jurisdiction. It noted that the Santa
Clara pueblo expressly had been set aside by the federal government, and that the New Mexico Statehood Act accepts that Indian
lands will be under the “‘absolute jurisdiction and control of the
234
Congress.’”
The Court’s opinion focused on whether the legal status of the
pueblo Indians had become too close to that of other citizens to
allow Congress to legislate for them as Indians. The Court determined that Congress “‘has a right to determine for itself when the
guardianship which has been maintained over the Indian shall
235
In its most significant passage, Sandoval declared that
cease.’”
the federal government has power to legislate for all “dependent
236
Indian communities” in the United States.
The “dependent Indian communities” test again was em237
ployed in United States v. McGowan, which together with Sandoval forms the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). As discussed in the introduction to this Article, McGowan involved a federal

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 449.
Id.
See id. at 450-51.
See id. at 449-50.
See id. at 450-51.
231 U.S. 28 (1913).
Id. at 36-37 n.1 (quoting Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 559).
Id. at 46 (quoting Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911)).
Id.
302 U.S. 535 (1938).
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prosecution for the importation of liquor into Nevada’s Reno Indian Colony. The colony consisted of twenty-eight acres that Congress had purchased for needy Indians in 1917.238 Obviously, this
tiny plot could not stand as its own nation. No one expected that it
would carry out its own civil and criminal administration, or that
state laws would be ineffective within its borders.
The court of appeals thus concluded that the Reno Indian
239
Colony could not be Indian country. It assumed that an Indian
country designation would mean the area was outside the reach of
240
The panel looked to a series of federal cases estabstate law.
lishing that land can be removed from a state’s jurisdiction only
241
with the state’s consent. One of the cases it quoted was the Supreme Court’s decision in Surplus Trading, which reaffirmed that
state consent is a prerequisite to the creation of a jurisdictional enclave. Because Nevada had never ceded its authority over the col242
ony, the court determined that it could not be Indian country.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Reno Colony
243
The Court made clear that it was
was indeed Indian country.
modifying the definition of that term so that it would apply to an
area where the state retained jurisdiction. McGowan noted that
the words “Indian country” had been employed in the federal laws
244
for many years without a new statutory delineation. Once again,
the Court declared that the term must be defined in light of “‘the
245
changes which have taken place in our situation.’”
In this case, the Court emphasized that Congress had made
the Reno Colony the equivalent of a reservation, as the land had
been “‘validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under
246
The Court
the superintendence of the federal government.’”
thus found that the colony fell within the scope of the Indian coun247
try statutes as a “‘dependent Indian communit[y].’”
The McGowan opinion left no doubt that an Indian country
finding does not retract the state’s jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that “the federal government does not assert exclusive ju-

238. See id. at 537.
239. United States v. McGowan, 89 F.2d 201, 202 (9th Cir. 1937).
240. See id.
241. See id. (citing Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 651 (1930);
United States v. Penn, 48 F. 669, 670 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1880); United States v.
Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 646 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819) (No. 14,867)).
242. See id.
243. See McGowan, 302 U.S. at 535.
244. See id. at 537.
245. Id. at 537-38 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883)).
246. Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914)).
247. Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)).

MATAL2

314

12/09/97 9:50 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

risdiction within the colony. Enactments of the federal government passed to protect and guard its Indian wards only affect the
operation, within the colony, of such state laws as conflict with the
federal enactments.”248
The McGowan Court based this conclusion on two prior deci249
the first Supreme Court decisions: Hallowell v. United States,
sion to apply the Indian country label to an area under state law,
250
and Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, the same case which the Ninth
Circuit had relied on for the proposition that a state’s authority
251
over its land and people can be taken away only with its consent.
The rest is legislative history. In 1948, the compilers of the revised statutes codified the Donnelly, Pelican, Sandoval, and
McGowan decisions as the definition of Indian country:
The term “Indian country,” as used in this chapter, means (a) all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, in252
cluding rights-of-way running through the same.

Donnelly became subsection (a), which brings all federal Indian reservations within the scope of Indian country. Pelican is the
source of subsection (c), which makes restricted allotments Indian
country, and Sandoval and McGowan form the basis of subsection
(b), which declares that Indian country exists wherever there is a
“dependent Indian community.” It is to these cases that courts
must look to determine what the statutory definition of Indian
country was intended to import.
III. INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY
The courts have forgotten all that went into the making of the
Indian country statute. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court began to conflate 18 U.S.C. § 1151 with sovereignty. It started to assume that whenever the statutory criteria for Indian country are
met, all state law is preempted. Although most of these new 18
U.S.C. § 1151 cases still reach the correct result, and their mistake
is not firmly rooted in the high court’s jurisprudence, the signals

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 539.
221 U.S. 317 (1911).
281 U.S. 647 (1930).
See McGowan, 302 U.S. at 288 n.14.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
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they send have steered the lower courts in the wrong direction,
where more serious consequences have arisen.
A. A Wrong Turn
The first post-1948 Supreme Court decision to address questions of Indian country and tribal territory continued to apply the
proper standard. Three cases from 1962 demonstrate that Court’s
appreciation for the distinction between 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and the
test for tribal sovereignty.
253
In Seymour v. Superintendent, a unanimous Court held that
18 U.S.C. § 1151 extends the Major Crimes Act over an entire reservation. The burglary at issue had occurred on a parcel of land
254
held in fee by a non-Indian. The Court dismissed the argument
that the lot constituted an exception to the reservation for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, as subsection (a) specifically states that
it applies throughout the reservation, “‘notwithstanding the issu255
ance of any patent.’” Seymour found that subsection (a) was in256
tended to avoid a checkerboard pattern of jurisdiction. All of the
land within a reservation remains Indian country for federal criminal purposes, even individual parcels that have been transferred to
outsiders.
Two months after Seymour was decided, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of what makes an Indian area immune from
257
state law. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan and its companion
258
case, Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, review an Alaska
Supreme Court ruling that the state could apply its fishing regula259
tions to the two Indian villages. To define the reach of state law,
the Court did not look to 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Rather, it inquired into
whether there had been a federal set aside of land and subsequent
cession of jurisdiction by the state. It found that the state had disclaimed jurisdiction, and that a reservation had been created in
260
261
Metlakatla, but not in Kake.

253. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
254. See id.
255. Id. at 357-58 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
256. See id.
257. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
258. 369 U.S. 45 (1962). Both cases are discussed in Part II.B.2.
259. See supra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
260. See Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 57-59. In Metlakatla, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision and remanded with
instructions to consider the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to enact the
salmon trap regulations under the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989,
which created the Metlakatla reservation. See id. at 59.
261. See Kake, 369 U.S. at 62.
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Kake, Metlakatla, and Seymour adhered to the founding cases
of the Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence. They recognized
the distinction, developed at the beginning of the century, between
Indian country and tribal territory. Seymour relied on 18 U.S.C. §
1151 to define the scope of the federal criminal laws, while Kake
and Metlakatla looked for an affirmative cession of jurisdiction by
the state to define sovereignty. These decisions were a modern anchor for all that had occurred in the last century and a half. Had
the Court continued to follow their lead, we would not be facing
the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Unfortunately, the coming years saw a heavy turnover in the
Supreme Court’s membership. By the mid-1970s, only three of the
Justices who had participated in Kake and Seymour remained on
the Court. Justice Frankfurter retired the year after he wrote for
the Court in Kake and Metlakatla. Justice Black, the author of
Seymour, left the Court in 1972. Black had also written Williams v.
262
Lee, the modern Court’s reaffirmation of tribal self-government.
Together, these two Justices were the Supreme Court’s institutional memory of Indian law. When they left, the Court’s understanding of the new Indian country statute and the principles of
tribal sovereignty went with them.
The Court first began to conflate 18 U.S.C. § 1151 with tribal
263
sovereignty in 1975 in DeCoteau v. District County Court. That
case addressed whether the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe retained jurisdiction over those portions of its reservation that had been
264
opened to white settlement in the late nineteenth century. The
Court held that language providing that the tribes would “cede,
sell, relinquish, and convey . . . all their claim, right, title, and in265
266
terest” in unallotted lands had diminished the reservation. The
tribe had sovereign authority only over the few restricted allot267
ments that had been excepted from this cession.
While DeCoteau’s result is unremarkable, its analysis is troubling. The Court accepted without investigation the parties’
agreement that “state courts [would] not have jurisdiction if these
268
lands are ‘Indian country,’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”
Throughout the opinion, the Court assumes that the boundaries of
tribal sovereignty are defined by Indian country.
The second footnote in DeCoteau cites 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) for
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

358 U.S. 217 (1959).
420 U.S. 425 (1975).
See id. at 426-27.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 989, 1036.
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445.
See id. at 445-46.
Id. at 427.
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the proposition that if the area in question is a continuing reservation, “jurisdiction is in the tribe and the [f]ederal [g]overnment.”269
18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) is the codification of Donnelly v. United
270
States. In that very case, the Court had made clear that the Indian country law it was applying did “not mean that the United
States must have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian
271
country.” However, DeCoteau assumed that the opposite is gen272
Had the court found that the area in question fell
erally true.
within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), it would have held that
state jurisdiction was excluded.
Since DeCoteau found that the reservation had been dimin273
ished, its misunderstanding of the Indian country statute did not
affect the outcome in that case. In subsequent years, lower courts
274
would criticize the high court’s interpretation of the statute. One
jurisdiction has dismissed DeCoteau’s statement that 18 U.S.C. §
1151 preempts state civil jurisdiction, finding that “the authority
275
for this proposition cited by the Court does not support it.”
However, for the most part, lower courts have felt bound by
DeCoteau, assuming that it requires them to apply 18 U.S.C. § 1151
276
to preempt all state law.
The Supreme Court itself relied on DeCoteau twelve years
277
later in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. Of the
several high court decisions to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as establishing sovereignty, this is the only one where the mistake led to an
improper result. In Cabazon, the Court addressed whether the
Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Indians could conduct high stakes
278
bingo games on their reservation in disregard of California law.
The Court assumed that the reservation’s status as Indian country

269. Id. at 427 n.2.
270. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
271. Id. at 268.
272. See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427.
273. See id. at 445.
274. See, e.g., People of South Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp.
870 (D. Alaska 1979); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chischilly, 628 P.2d
683 (N.M. 1981).
275. People of South Naknek, 466 F. Supp. at 877 n.11.
276. See, e.g., Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 915 (1st Cir. 1996); Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining
Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 n.10 (10th Cir. 1995); Indian Country,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 973 (10th
Cir. 1987).
277. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
278. See id. at 205.
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retracted the state’s civil and criminal jurisdiction.279
The Cabazon reservation had been established by executive
280
order in 1876. California never had ceded jurisdiction over the
area. This is the same year that the California Hoopa Valley res281
ervation at issue in Kagama and Donnelly had been created. In
both of those cases, it was taken as given that the creation of a reservation after statehood, without any subsequent cession of
authority by the state, did not divest the state of its jurisdiction.
In Cabazon, however, the Court assumed that “Indian country” means sovereignty. It concluded that the tribe’s activities
were beyond the reach of state law, since “[s]tate regulation would
282
The Cabazon
impermissibly infringe on tribal government.”
tribe therefore was a sovereign nation. The high court’s willingness to recognize such a fiefdom, with powers of self-rule and immunity from the state law, is particularly jarring in light of the fact
283
that the tribe had only twenty-five members.
The notion that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 creates tribal territory has
been reaffirmed in three 1990s cases, all of which involve the
284
Oklahoma Tax Commission. The first decision, Oklahoma Tax
285
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, demonstrates just how deep the Supreme Court’s misunderstanding of
Indian country has become. Potawatomi’s construction of 18
U.S.C. § 1151 looks to the 1938 McGowan case and a more recent
286
The John Court had addressed
decision, United States v. John.
287
only the reach of the federal criminal statutes. It did not assume
that its “Indian country” finding would repeal all state jurisdic288
Rather, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines the
tion.
scope of the Major Crimes Act, and that when the Act applies, it

279. See id. at 207 n.5.
280. See id. at 204 n.1.
281. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 253 (1913); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 375 (1886).
282. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 222.
283. See id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. A further coincidence is that two of the three cases involve tribes that had
been removed to Oklahoma from the Great Lakes region. See Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 116 (1993); Brief for Respondent,
1990 WL 508092, at *7-8, Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (No. 89-1322).
285. 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (holding that states may not tax sales of goods to
tribal Indians in Indian country but may tax sales to non-members of the tribe).
286. See id. at 511 (citing United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); United
States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)).
287. See John, 437 U.S. at 647.
288. See id. at 649.
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preempts state criminal laws.289
Potawatomi’s reliance on McGowan is even more remarkable.
It cites that case for the proposition that an area is beyond the
reach of state law whenever it has been “‘validly set apart for the
use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the
[federal government].’”290 Of course, it is McGowan that had made
explicit that the Indian country label “only affect[s] the operation
291
. . . of such state laws as conflict with the federal enactments.” In
other words, McGowan’s “Indian country” remains under the
state’s presumptive authority. Local law is only displaced under
the same circumstances in which it would be displaced anywhere:
292
when it conflicts with the application of a federal law.
The Potawatomi opinion indicates that today the Court is
completely unaware of the changes that were made to the “Indian
country” concept earlier in the century. It is relying on the codified cases to define the scope of Indian country without regard to
how those decisions altered the meaning of that term.
Potawatomi is cited by Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac &
293
Fox Nation, a case which declares that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 Indian
294
country lies outside of the state’s taxing jurisdiction. Sac & Fox
Nation defines Indian country as including “formal and informal
reservations, dependent Indian communities, and Indian allot295
ments, whether restricted or held in trust by the United States.”
Sac & Fox Nation was recently cited in Oklahoma Tax Commis296
sion v. Chickasaw Nation, which also holds that 18 U.S.C. § 1151
297
defines the state’s tax authority.
It bears mention that in all of the Oklahoma Tax Commission
cases, the lands at issue were in fact tribal territory. The first section of the Oklahoma Statehood Act preserves all Indian treaties,
guaranteeing they will continue to have the same effect as if “this
298
Act had never been passed.” Furthermore, the areas in question
in each of these cases had been set aside for the tribes by the fed299
Under Organized Village of Kake v. Egan300
eral government.

289. See id. at 649, 651 (citing Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351
(1962)).
290. Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 511 (quoting McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539).
291. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539.
292. See id.
293. 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
294. See id. at 124-25.
295. Id. at 123 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
296. 515 U.S. 450, 453 n.2 (1995).
297. See id. at 453.
298. Pub. L. No. 234, 34 Stat. 267-68 (1906).
299. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 453-55; Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac
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and the founding cases, all of these lands are beyond the reach of
state law.
The Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1151
has not much affected its own decisions. The only beneficiary of
the confusion has been the tiny Cabazon Nation, which won an ex301
emption from state regulation of its bingo operations. However,
the circuits continue to rely on DeCoteau and its progeny to dismiss arguments for state jurisdiction where they could make a difference.
In a 1996 First Circuit case, the state of Rhode Island had contended that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 should not preempt its regulatory
302
The state’s attorney
authority over an Indian housing project.
questioned the logic of applying 18 U.S.C. § 1151 in this way, and
303
noted that one circuit had refused to do so. The panel acknowledged that the statute on its face applies only to criminal jurisdic304
tion. However, it concluded that it “need not address these ar305
guments in detail,” since the previous year in Chickasaw Nation
the Supreme Court had reiterated that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 preempts
306
all state jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit relied on Cabazon and Potawatomi when it
withdrew the state of Alaska’s jurisdiction over 1.8 million acres of
307
its territory in Venetie II. The Alaska cases point to a conflict in
& Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 117 (1993); Brief for Respondent, 1990 WL 508092,
at *8-11, Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (No. 89-1322). All three tribes had been subjected to allotment,
but the areas over which they asserted sovereignty had been reserved to them and
were still held in trust by the United States. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at
453; Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 507-09; Respondent’s Brief at *8-14 & n.11, Potawatomi, 1990 WL 508092; Sac & Fox, 508 U.S. at 116-19; Sac & Fox Nation v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 967 F.2d 1425, 1427 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1992).
300. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
301. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22
(1987).
302. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 91516 (1st Cir. 1996).
303. See id. at 916 (discussing Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 502 U.S. 251
(1992)).
304. See id. at 915.
305. Id. at 916.
306. See id. at 915-16 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. 450, 453 n.2 (1995)); see also Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245,
250 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on Sac & Fox to find that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 preempts
state taxing jurisdiction).
307. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t (Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1291-93 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
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the Supreme Court’s Indian law jurisprudence. Under one line of
recent decisions, there would be no question that the Venetie reservation had been terminated and all tribal sovereignty extinguished. This tension is also apparent in some of the recent circuit
cases. The lower courts have applied 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to recognize
sovereignty in some of the same areas where the Supreme Court
had recently found sovereignty to be terminated. Before these
conflicts are examined, however, the next section explores why the
Supreme Court has lost its bearings in Indian country.
B. Scholarly Misguidance
In a footnote to his opinion in the first of the Venetie decisions, Judge Kleinfeld of Fairbanks compares the various editions
of Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law. He points out
that only the first version was actually written by Cohen. The 1982
edition, he contends, fell under the sway of its era; it appropriates
the prestige of Cohen’s name to promote a view of Indian law
308
skewed in favor of tribal sovereignty.
Judge Kleinfeld is only half right. While the 1982 edition exhibits a pluralist bias, the first Handbook also is not the product of
a pre-ideological era. Felix Cohen was a staff attorney at the Department of Interior during the New Deal. He was one of the
309
principal drafters of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. The
strong preference for tribal sovereignty expressed in that legislation also colors the first Handbook’s presentation of basic principles of Indian law.
While the 1942 edition is quite comprehensive, it overlooks
critical changes made to the definition of Indian country in preceding decades. The section devoted to the topic begins by declaring that Indian country “may perhaps be most usefully defined
as country within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws
310
Only the second
relating to Indians are generally applicable.”
half of that statement is an accurate description of the law. The
early twentieth century cases had created a new definition of Indian country that was no longer coextensive with tribal sover311
eignty. The new test was not meant to describe the area where
state law is excluded.
The 1942 Handbook readily adopts the modern boundaries of
Indian country but ignores key statements about what those
boundaries mean. Nowhere is this plainer than in the treatment of
308. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380,
1390 n.2 (D. Alaska 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
309. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at vii.
310. See COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 5.
311. See supra Part II.B.4.
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312
United States v. McGowan. There the U.S. Supreme Court had
drawn the broadest definition of Indian country yet, declaring that
it exists wherever land has been set aside for Indians under federal
313
The Handbook quotes from this portion of
superintendence.
314
However, that decision also explicitly
McGowan generously.
states that Indian country is not a marker of sovereignty and does
315
not preempt state law. This part of McGowan was not included
in the 1942 Handbook.
The first edition largely ignores the principles of state cession
of jurisdiction that had been developed over the last century. It
acknowledges their existence, but finds that a discussion of these
316
doctrines would be a “digression.” The Handbook does make a
passing reference to the creation of federal enclaves. It notes that
jurisdictional disclaimers in statehood acts are a “persuasive justification” for what it describes as “the incapacity of the states to
317
legislate on Indian affairs.”
This last statement is revealing of Felix Cohen’s general approach to Indian law. The peculiar understanding of Indian-state
relations he presents is one in which the states presumptively lack
jurisdiction over their resident Indians. He argues that the old
doctrine that a state is sovereign within its borders must yield to “a
sense of realism.” When it comes to Indians, Cohen contends,
states lack authority unless it has either been expressly delegated
318
by Congress or non-Indians are involved.
Cohen’s vision bears a striking resemblance to the Supreme
319
Court’s early reasoning in United States v. Kagama, where it had
assumed that Indians would never become a part of the state’s
320
polity. The Kagama court had been uncomfortable with the exercise of federal police authority over Indians within a state. It
tried to rationalize the federal criminal laws, which had always
been tied to an absence of state jurisdiction, by imagining a con321
tinuing gap in the states’ legal relationship with the Indians. As
mentioned previously, this aspect of Kagama did not survive. New
federal policies forcibly incorporated Indians into their states, and
the Supreme Court accepted the notion that Congress has a ple-

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

302 U.S. 535 (1938).
See id. at 537-39.
See COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 8.
See McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539.
COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 117.
Id. at 116.
See id. at 117-19.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
See id. at 384.
See id. at 382-84.
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nary “wardship” power over Indians.322
However, Kagama’s suggestion that Indians would remain jurisdictional gypsies, with no state to call their own, contained considerable appeal for Cohen. The first Handbook quotes heavily
from the relevant portion of Kagama, although it expresses reservations about the decision’s description of the condition of Indi323
Cohen argues Kagama’s approach can be justified on the
ans.
basis of treaties, but no treaties were at issue in that case.
In the end, Cohen’s unique vision of Indian affairs must be attributed to his era. Like many of the New Dealers, he saw the
states as an anachronism, a barrier to the progress to be achieved
by centralized administration. Despite the prestige of his Handbook, Cohen’s ambitions for the field of Indian law do not represent its past and did not predict its future.
With all its shortcomings, however, the first edition is a model
of disclosure when compared to the 1982 Handbook. This latest
version flatly asserts that state law is displaced by tribal law
324
It discusses the
throughout 18 U.S.C. § 1151 Indian country.
codified cases without mentioning the changes they brought to the
meaning of that label. It then declares that “the intent of Congress, as elucidated by these decisions, was to designate as Indian
country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of
325
The Handbook even
tribal Indians under federal protection.”
suggests that individual plots granted to Indians outside of any res326
ervation are sovereign Indian country.
The 1982 edition does not ignore the foundation cases; instead, it quarrels with them in the footnotes. It mentions the rules
for establishing federal enclaves, but then argues that while state
consent is usually required for exclusive federal jurisdiction, this is
327
The only support the Handnot the case with Indian country.
book cites for this proposition is its own chapter on Indian country.
The 1982 edition mentions that most territorial and statehood
legislation of the mid-nineteenth century included express disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indian lands. As discussed in Part
II.B.2 of this Article, this was perhaps the most important feature
of federal Indian law during this era. It allowed the United States
to continue to exercise general police powers in Indian areas, and
it created the freedom from state law that made independent tribal
government possible. The Handbook dismisses the entire devel322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
See COHEN 1942, supra note 55, at 116-17.
See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 27-28, 270.
Id. at 34.
See id. at 40-41.
See id. at 260 n.8.
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opment in one sentence. It finds that “[a]s a general matter these
[statehood act] clauses were not necessary, since the Supreme
Court has sustained the same federal and tribal authority in states
admitted without such clauses.”328
Needless to say, the cases the Handbook cites for this proposi329
tion do not support it. The authors rely on Worcester v. Georgia
330
and The New York Indians.
Obviously, both New York and
Georgia do not have cession clauses in their statehood acts; none
of the states that formed the original union was admitted pursuant
to a statehood act.
More fundamentally, there is no suggestion in either of these
cases that Congress may unilaterally withdraw a state’s jurisdiction
over its territory. In both cases, Congress had entered into treaties
guaranteeing the tribes’ use and occupancy of the lands well before
331
the boundaries of the states had been settled. Georgia’s borders
were determined by a resolution of competing claims with South
Carolina in 1787 and a final cession of western claims to the
United States in 1802. In both instances, it accepted the lands at
332
issue subject to Indian title. The lands in question in The New
York Indians had been claimed by Massachusetts; when they were
finally made a part of New York, that state also acknowledged ex333
isting Indian rights.
In the case of the original thirteen colonies, it can also be argued that any treaty entered into before the United States came
into being effectively was consented to by the existing states. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was uncertain whether the

328. Id. at 268.
329. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
330. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866).
331. See Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15; Treaty of Fort Harmar, Jan. 9, 1788, 7 Stat. 33 (cited in The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at
762 n.1); Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art. IV, 1
Laws U.S. 322 (discussed in Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-53); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 60-61, 66-67 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
332. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139, 141-43 (1810) (1787
agreement); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-60; id. at 583-84 (M’Lean, J., concurring); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 76 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (1802
cession).
Any remaining ambiguity as to prior state acquiescence to Indian autonomy in Worcester had been resolved by subsequent acts of the Georgia legislature
in 1796 and 1819. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 585-86 (M’Lean, J., concurring).
333. See 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 762; see also COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 417 n.9
(citing Department of Justice Memorandum noting that in colonial times, Iroquois Confederacy territory was “definitely set apart” from lands of colony of
New York).
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states or the national government had primary authority in Indian
affairs.334 The decentralized nature of the confederacy was such
that agreements of that era can be regarded as the action of the
335
states, rather than those of a separate sovereign.
In any event, nothing in Worcester or The New York Indians
supports the existence of an “Indian exception” to states’ rights.
The other cases cited by the 1982 Handbook support only the existence of federal authority to legislate for Indians or to guarantee
them privileges. Some of these cases stand for the rule, discussed
in Part II.B.2, that previous treaties are regarded as legislation
upon statehood. One of the cases the Handbook relies on is
United States v. McGowan, which has been sufficiently discussed at
this point to make unnecessary any further explanation that it does
336
not recognize a unilateral federal power to create enclaves.
Many of the 1982 Handbook’s supporting examples for the
proposition that consent is not needed for a federal Indian enclave
are from a period when the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed
foundation principles. For instance, The New York Indians was
337
decided during the same term as The Kansas Indians, and it cites
to that case. Yet The Kansas Indians opinion makes clear that the
jurisdictional exemption it upholds is the product of a state cession
338
of sovereignty.
The case that poses the greatest challenge to the Handbook’s
339
As discussed
version of the law is United States v. McBratney.
earlier, there the Supreme Court had found that the absence of an
exception in the Colorado Statehood Act “necessarily repeals the
provisions of any prior statute, or of any existing treaty, which are
340
clearly inconsistent therewith.” As a result, the state had jurisdiction over the Ute Indian reservation. Here is what the 1982
Handbook has to say about the case:
The McBratney opinion was brief and far from clear. It purported to be based on statutory interpretation, but it is difficult
334. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 63-65 (Thompson, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 17 (majority opinion) (noting that under the “unsettled construction
of the confederation,” New York negotiated directly with tribes).
335. See generally William G. Rice, Jr., The Position of the American Indian in
the Law of the United States, 16 J. COMP. LEG. 78, 80-81 (1934) (noting that the
original states largely dealt with Indians on their own and that Indian lands
therein “are probably subject to a different legal regime”).
336. See supra Parts I, II.B.4.
337. 72 U.S. 737 (1866).
338. See id. at 740, 753, 756 (“[T]he rights of the Indians . . . and the stipulations of the treaties, were fully preserved . . . both in the organic act and the act
for the admission of Kansas.”).
339. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
340. Id. at 623; see also supra Part II.B.2.
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to arrive at the Court’s result by any ordinary approach to statutory construction. One possibility is that the Court simply misread the laws. Another is that concerns about constitutional
limits on federal power influenced the decision. The decision
was likely influenced by the fact that federal Indian laws at the
time were mostly focused on interracial problems. Whatever the
basis, it is unlikely that the same result would be reached today
341
in a case of first impression.
342

Prior to McBratney, United States v. Rogers had upheld federal jurisdiction over a crime between two whites in Indian country. McBratney cites to that case and states that it would uphold
federal jurisdiction in Colorado if the state had made a cession of
343
authority. To say that today Congress could regulate crimes between whites on a reservation under state authority begs the question. McBratney came only a few years before Kagama recognized
a federal police power for Indian affairs. McBratney avoids passing on the validity of treaties that promised crimes involving Indi344
ans would go to federal court.
The only treaty or statute that could have authorized federal
jurisdiction over the white-on-white murder in McBratney was the
345
But McBratney came at a time
Indian Country Crimes Act.
when Indian country was still defined as being outside of any
state’s jurisdiction. Because Colorado had not surrendered its sovereignty over the area, there was no Indian country in McBratney,
and thus no federal law that could apply. Contrary to the 1982
Handbook’s assertions, McBratney makes it very clear that Indian
lands are beyond the reach of state law only when there has been
an affirmative cession of jurisdiction by the state.
The discussion of Indian country in Felix Cohen’s Handbook
of Federal Indian Law is unsatisfactory. Unfortunately, this treatise has played a guiding role in modern jurisprudence. Since it
was first issued in 1942, the Handbook has frequently been relied
346
It has also served as a template for
on by the Supreme Court.
subsequent treatises in this area; no other source challenges its

341. COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 264-66. The 1982 Handbook explores every
possibility other than that McBratney means what it says, devoting three successive
footnotes — more than a page — to attacking the case. See id. at 264-65 nn.44-46.
342. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
343. See McBratney, 104 U.S. at 623.
344. See id. at 624.
345. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1, 3 Stat. 383.
346. See, e.g., Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 402 (1994), reh’g denied, 511 U.S.
1047 (1994); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 n.6 (1973); Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 73 (1962); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219 n.4 (1959); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 8-9 & n.15 (1956).
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conclusions about Indian country.
The Handbook’s prestige probably helped to steer the courts’
understanding of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 in the wrong direction in the
1970s. In 1958, the Handbook was revised by the Department of
Interior and was thereafter referred to as a government publica347
tion. A work attributed to those who implemented the assimilationist policies of the 1950s could hardly have been suspected of a
pluralist bias.
The Handbook’s continuing influence is evident in the recent
Oklahoma Tax Commission trilogy. In Sac & Fox Nation, the Supreme Court adopted the 1982 edition’s definition of Indian country as its own standard for determining when a state’s jurisdiction
348
is preempted. The Handbook’s failure to explain the principles
underlying the founding cases, or the changes made by the codified
cases, has undoubtedly contributed to the current confusion over
Indian country. The next section argues that this state of affairs is
untenable.
C. A Conflict of Authority
The contradictions in using 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as a jurisdictional
marker are brought into relief by the Court’s reservation termination cases. These decisions hold that particular language in federal
statutes will be regarded as extinguishing tribal sovereignty and introducing state jurisdiction. However, land that is within a state’s
domain under the termination test can at the same time qualify as
18 U.S.C. § 1151 Indian country.
The first of the recent termination cases is DeCoteau v. Dis349
trict County Court. That decision found that language requiring
the Sisseton-Wahpeton tribe to “‘cede, sell, relinquish, and con350
vey’” its “‘claim, right, title and interest’” in particular territory
351
Two years later,
extinguished its sovereignty over the area.
352
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip also discovered an intent to terminate in an act providing that the tribe would “cede, surrender,
grant, and convey” all its “claim, right, title and interest” to a part
353
354
of its reservation. Recently, Hagen v. Utah announced that the
court will find an intent to terminate whenever the language in a
347. See, e.g., Williams, 358 U.S. at 219; Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 151 n.6.
348. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125
(1993).
349. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
350. Id. at 439 n. 22 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1036, 1036).
351. See id. at 445.
352. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
353. Id. at 591 n.8.
354. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
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statute declares that reservation land is restored to the public domain.355
In all of these cases, it was understood that termination led to
356
When the special status of Indian lands has
state jurisdiction.
ended, state law applies to the Indians who live there. However,
even an express statement of termination does not preclude the
possibility that the Indians in the area will remain dependent on
the federal government. While the DeCoteau line of cases looks
357
for congressional intent to extinguish sovereignty, the 18 U.S.C. §
1151 test is fact dependent.
But if 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is jurisdictional, then the same area can
both remain tribal territory under the Indian country statute and
no longer be tribal territory under the termination cases. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 and the termination test are capable of producing opposite
results. Even a reservation that has been extinguished by Congress
can revert to a jurisdictional enclave if the 1948 Indian country
statute applies.
This is exactly what has happened to the reservation at issue
in DeCoteau. Six years after the Supreme Court had declared that
South Dakota had civil and criminal jurisdiction over the area and
its residents, the Eighth Circuit held that it did not. In United
358
States v. South Dakota, the Eighth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C. §
1151 to land within the former reservation and found that it was
359
Indian country. The parcel in question had been restored to the
360
public domain and sold. It was ultimately conveyed to a church,
which transferred the land back to the federal government under
361
the condition that it be used for a low-rent housing project. The
court applied United States v. McGowan, found that the housing
project was a dependent Indian community, and entered a judgment restraining the state from asserting jurisdiction over the
362
area. Land that had been placed under the state’s authority just
a few years earlier by the Supreme Court was once again beyond

355. See id. at 414. For a general discussion of the reservation termination
cases, see Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18 N.M. L. REV. 403, 455-58 (1988)
(suggesting the extent of non-Indian ownership guides the court’s determination
of whether surplus lands remain tribal territory).
356. See Hagen, 510 U.S. at 409; Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 598;
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 442.
357. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 586 (“The underlying premise is that
Congressional intent will control.”); DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444.
358. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
359. See id. at 841-43.
360. See id. at 839.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 841-43.
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its reach as a result of the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
The Eighth Circuit has done the same thing to land whose reservation status was terminated in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.363
In United States v. Driver,364 the court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court had held that the area in question was no longer part
of the Rosebud Sioux reservation, but it also found that the area
“nevertheless” qualified as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. §
365
1151(b).
Driver also involved an Indian housing project. The court’s
conclusion that its residents remained dependent on the federal
government is a reasonable application of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, particularly in light of United States v. McGowan, which itself involved
an Indian housing project. However, if 18 U.S.C. § 1151 demarcates tribal sovereignty, then state jurisdiction will turn solely on
which test is being applied at the moment. In Driver, nothing had
changed since the Supreme Court had determined that aboriginal
rights to the area had been extinguished. Yet the Eighth Circuit
could determine that tribal rights survived. Once again, land that
had been placed under the state’s jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court was removed from it by a lower court through the application of the 1948 Indian country statute.
The contradictions in reading sovereignty into 18 U.S.C. §
366
1151 are compounded by Montana v. United States. That case introduced the rule that tribes generally lack authority over lands
367
within a reservation that have been transferred to outsiders.
Such persons can be regulated only if they enter into commercial
agreements with the tribe, or if their activities threaten the
“political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
368
of the tribe.” Because these Montana lands are enclaves within a
reservation, the tribe is allowed some authority over them. Any
other rule would disrupt the tribe’s ability to govern its territory.
The scope of the tribe’s retained powers in these areas has never
been fully spelled out. Presumably, though, the tribe could still arrest tribal members who ventured there, or prevent the owners
from engaging in nuisance activities such as selling alcohol.
The irony of Montana is that it ignores the current understanding that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines tribal sovereignty. The
court found an absence of tribal power over lands that it assumed
would qualify as Indian country. The opinion explains that “[i]f
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

430 U.S. 584, 591 n.8 (1977).
945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1415.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
See id. at 557-67.
Id. at 566.
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Congress had wished to extend tribal jurisdiction to lands owned
by non-Indians, it could easily have done so by incorporating . . .
the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”369 The
Montana court then quotes the portion of the statute that declares
that all land within a reservation is Indian country, notwithstanding “‘any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the
370
In Seymour v. Superintendent,371 the Court had
reservation.’”
found this language to mean that non-Indian lots within a reserva372
tion are still Indian country.
Montana is consistent with Seymour’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1151’s scope. However,
Montana departs from the recent understanding that Indian country means sovereignty; instead, it holds that tribes lack authority
over 18 U.S.C. § 1151 lands held by non-Indians.
Had Montana not been followed in subsequent years, the prevailing rule today still would be that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines sovereignty. Two cases from the mid-1980s appeared to displace
373
Montana. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
374
and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante both held that tribal
courts must be allowed to make the initial determination of
whether they have jurisdiction over disputes arising on Montana
375
lands.
Iowa Mutual even declares that “[c]ivil jurisdiction over
[the activities of non-members] presumptively lies in tribal
376
courts.” These decisions left it far from certain that tribes would
377
lack jurisdiction over non-member lands within a reservation.
However, Montana was reaffirmed strongly in 1993 by South
378
Dakota v. Bourland. That case held that a tribe no longer had
the power to regulate the use of land within its reservation that had
379
been taken by the United States for a flood control project.
More significantly, in 1997, the Supreme Court effectively overruled National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.
380
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court held that only the
state court had jurisdiction over an auto accident occurring on a
369. Id. at 562.
370. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994)).
371. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
372. See id. at 426-28.
373. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
374. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
375. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 853-57; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-18.
376. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18.
377. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 455 n.5 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding Iowa Mutual
supports tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians).
378. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
379. Id. at 688-89.
380. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
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state right-of-way running through a reservation.381 The most important part of the opinion is the footnote attached to the last
paragraph. It declares that now that it is clear that tribal courts
lack even civil jurisdiction over disputes arising from non-member
conduct on Montana lands, the tribal-court exhaustion require382
ment “must give way.” Strate erases any doubt that tribes presumptively lack authority over non-member lands within a reservation. The court’s opinion in that case was unanimous.
The current Supreme Court thus is firmly committed to the
Montana rule: tribes lack sovereignty over outsiders’ patents and
rights-of-way. However, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 expressly brings these
lands within its definition of Indian country. Subsection (a) declares that Indian country encompasses “all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation . . . notwithstanding the issuance of any
383
This language would include the
patent [or] rights of way.”
homesteader lots at issue in Montana, as that opinion acknowl384
It would also include the state right-of-way at issue in
edged.
385
Strate. The decision in Seymour v. Superintendent affirms this
view. Its holding that non-Indian lands within a reservation are
still Indian country has never been repudiated. Indeed, the Su386
preme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that case.
There is a direct conflict between the Supreme Court’s current
understanding of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and the termination cases and
Montana. As subsequent events in both DeCoteau and Rosebud
demonstrate, an area that has been brought under state jurisdiction
by the termination test can be removed from it by the Indian country test. Even if Congress has explicitly terminated a reservation, it
may still qualify as a dependent Indian community. Furthermore,
reservation rights-of-way and non-Indian lots are expressly included within the 18 U.S.C. § 1151 Indian country definition. A
court applying Seymour v. Superintendent to define sovereignty
would find state authority is excluded, but a court applying the
Montana rule would find that tribal authority is excluded. The Su-

381. See id. at 1414.
382. Id. at 1415 n.14.
383. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1994).
384. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1981).
385. 368 U.S. 351, 357-59 (1962).
386. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 410, 414 (1994); Negonsott v. Samuels,
507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993); Yakima County v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 260 (1992); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,
469 & n.10, 470 (1984); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1976); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444, 448-49 (1975); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
555 (1975).
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preme Court’s interpretation of the Indian country statute and
these other cases cannot coexist. The next section suggests which
of these precedents ought to be abandoned.
D. The Proper Test
The Supreme Court should return to the principles set forth in
the founding cases. Indian tribes should be recognized as sovereigns only in those areas where the state has ceded its authority.
No state should be subjected to a wholesale withdrawal of its jurisdiction without its consent.
While Congress’s laws are superior to state law, the Constitution binds both. The current construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is a
substantial intrusion upon states’ rights. Congress must acquire
the state’s consent in order to establish a competing sovereign
within its borders. Outside of a federal enclave, the state has presumptive jurisdiction. The federal government cannot delegate its
sovereign powers to a private entity or authorize a separate government within a state.
Nor has Congress ever sought to do so. This section argues
that no federal law purports to create tribal sovereignty outside of
the federal enclaves. It also contends that the Supreme Court’s
more recent decisions from other contexts point to the continuing
vitality of the principles underlying the original cases: except
where the state has ceded its authority, the state alone may exercise a general police power. The Supreme Court has never recognized an Indian exception to states’ rights.
1. A matter of statutory interpretation. Apart from any
constitutional concerns, the federal laws themselves should not be
construed to displace state jurisdiction. The Indian country statute
387
only codifies the early twentieth century cases. As discussed in
Part II.B.4, these decisions separated the Indian country concept
from tribal sovereignty and the absence of state authority.
The Supreme Court has recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 does
388
Recent opinions even depart from
not alter the original cases.

387. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was enacted in 1948. See Act of June 15, 1948, ch. 625,
62 Stat. 683, 757.
388. See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978) (“This language [of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defining ‘Indian Country’] first appeared in the Code
in 1948 as a part of the general revision of Title 18. The Reviser’s notes indicate
that this definition was based on several decisions of the Court interpreting the
term as it was used in various criminal statutes relating to Indians.”); see also Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. Max, 11 Ind. Rptr. 6038, 6041 (Siss.-Wahptn.
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1984) (“Congress merely codified existing case law when it included off-reservation ‘dependent Indian communities’ as part of Indian country
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the language of the statute and adopt standards that exist only in
those cases. The 1991 Potawatomi decision follows McGowan and
asks whether an area has been “set apart for the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the [g]overnment.”389 Two
years later, Sac & Fox Nation added a new wrinkle to the common
390
law, asking whether Indian lands are an “informal reservation.”
The Indian country statute is simply an adaptation of the Supreme
Court’s precedents. It draws its meaning from decisions that hold
that Indian country does not displace state jurisdiction.
Nor does any other federal statute seek to do so. The Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 authorizes tribal sovereignty only
where it is allowed under prior law. Section 16, which pertains to
tribal government, provides the following:
In addition to all power vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall
also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the following rights and
powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and fixing of fees to be subject to the approval of the Secretary; to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands,
interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the
tribe; and to negotiate with the [f]ederal, [s]tate and local
391
[g]overnments.

The only functions the IRA authorizes in the absence of preexisting tribal sovereignty are those of a private corporation. A
tribe that is not located in a continuing jurisdictional enclave does
392
not take on governmental authority under section 16. The IRA’s
drafters at one point considered giving tribes the powers of a mu393
nicipality, but in the end declined to do so.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently defined
tribal sovereignty in terms of territory, not the IRA. In Organized
394
Village of Kake v. Egan, the Court noted that the village of Kake
was chartered under the IRA. It nevertheless found that the Indians were subject to state law, since they did not reside on a reser395
396
vation.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones addresses whether
in the statute.”).
389. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498
U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
390. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).
391. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 984, 987.
392. See id.
393. See H.R. 7902, title 1, reprinted in Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 1-7
(1934); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 n.9 (1973).
394. 369 U.S. 60, 61, 62 (1962).
395. See id.; see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 183
(1989) (IRA, Indian Financing Act of 1974, and Indian Self-Determination and
Educational Assistance Act of 1975 not intended to preempt state taxing jurisdic-
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IRA councils are within the states’ tax jurisdiction.397 Again, the
determinative factor in the Court’s analysis was whether the tribe
398
was operating within a continuing reservation.
Mescalero re399
jected the view that IRA tribes are federal instrumentalities.
The Court also held that outside of a reservation, the tribe is subject to state law, regardless of whether it conducts its activities under the IRA section 17 business activities provision or the section
400
16 governmental functions provision.
Even if states were not constitutionally protected against
wholesale retractions of their jurisdiction, there would be no reason to read such a result into the relevant federal laws. Neither the
Indian country statute nor the IRA, Congress’s vehicle for Indian
self-government, is intended to authorize the exercise of sovereign
tribal powers outside of a continuing jurisdictional enclave.
2. States’ rights and other limits on federal power. The most
disturbing aspect of the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of
18 U.S.C. § 1151 is its subsumed holding that Congress may create
jurisdictional enclaves within a state in disregard of the
Constitution’s express limitations on the exercise of that power.
Clause 17 of Article I, section 8 predicates the suspension of a
401
state’s sovereignty over its territory on the consent of the state.
However, the McGowan dependent Indian communities test does
not require state consent. As Part II of this Article suggests,
consent is not required because the modern Indian country statute
was never intended to displace state authority in the first place. By
reading a wholesale jurisdictional preemption into 18 U.S.C. §
1151, the courts have attributed an unconstitutional motive to a
Congress that did not have one.
The principle that a state cannot be unilaterally divested of its
local sovereignty continues to be recognized in Supreme Court
cases outside of the Indian law context. In Kleppe v. New Mex402
ico, the court affirmed that federal ownership of lands within a
403
state does not withdraw the state’s authority over them. Absent
tion).
396. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
397. See id. at 146.
398. See id. at 148-50.
399. See id. at 148, 151, 153 & n.9.
400. See id. at 157-58 & n.13; see also Comment, Alaskan Native Indian Villages: The Question of Sovereign Rights, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 875, 884 (1988)
(noting that “only those ‘bands or tribes’ of Indians living on reservations shall
be . . . afforded applicable sovereign powers” under IRA section 16).
401. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
402. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
403. See id. at 544 (citing Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650
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“consent or cession, the [f]ederal [g]overnment [does] not acquire
exclusive jurisdiction.”404 At issue in Kleppe was a federal statute
that protected wild horses and burros on federal property. The
court held that although federal laws for federal lands preempt
state law to their extent, the state remains “free to enforce its
405
criminal and civil laws on those lands.”
The evolution of the Court’s enclaves jurisprudence has paralleled the development of principles of tribal sovereignty. Reservation Indians’ immunity from state law has diminished considera406
Similarly, as one
bly since the days of Worcester v. Georgia.
Justice has observed, “[t]he so-called exclusive jurisdiction” in federal enclaves “has, as a matter of historical fact, become increas407
ingly less and less exclusive.”
The most striking resemblance between the two areas of law is
in their rules for determining when the exclusion of state law has
408
ended. In S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, a non-Indian case, the court
found that state jurisdiction re-attaches to land within an enclave
409
The federal government’s
when it is sold to private parties.
“unrestricted transfer of property to non-federal hands is a relin410
quishment of the exclusive legislative power.”
S.R.A.’s holding
411
mirrors the rule of Montana v. United States, that tribal jurisdiction over lands within a reservation terminates when they are
412
transferred to outsiders.
The capacity of enclaves law to define the reach of state law in
tribal territory is limited, though. First, enclaves jurisprudence has
proved no more precise than Indian law. The court has remarked
that “[t]he course of the construction of [the enclaves] provision
413
cannot be said to have run smooth.” Furthermore, guarding “the
(1930)).
404. Id. (citing Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1946)).
405. Id. at 543; see also Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 372
(1964) (stating that the “crucial question” for defining reach of state law is
whether state has “ceded exclusive jurisdiction”).
406. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411
U.S. 164, 171-72 (1973) (stating that the Court has relaxed the Worcester principle
to allow state courts to hear cases “where essential tribal relations were not involved . . . .”); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (noting
that Worcester “has given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes”) (citations omitted).
407. Pacific Coast Dairy v. Cal. Dep’t of Agric., 318 U.S. 285, 299 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
408. 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946).
409. See id.
410. Id.
411. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
412. See id. at 570.
413. Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 256 (1956).
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right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them”414 inevitably raises unique considerations. For example, application of state laws governing relations between private persons
is unlikely to interfere with the federal government’s objectives
within an enclave. But state private law is just the type of regulation that tribal governments would be most anxious to exclude
from their territory.
However, enclaves principles should continue to be applied by
the Supreme Court to define the initial creation of tribal territory.
The states have a strong interest in controlling when their jurisdiction over land within their borders is taken away. When an area
becomes sovereign Indian country, states lose almost all ability to
raise revenue there. Yet they remain responsible for providing
415
The Supreme Court has republic services in tribal territory.
peatedly affirmed that states are separate sovereigns, with rights
and powers that cannot be taken away by the federal govern416
ment. But if Congress can unilaterally retract all state authority
over an area, and allocate it to another entity, then the states become little more than administrative agencies of the national government. A minimum respect for their independent prerogatives
would demand that a wholesale suspension of the states’ jurisdiction cannot be effected without their having some say in the matter.
When it comes to state sovereignty, the Supreme Court consistently has refused to recognize an “Indian exception” to the
Constitution’s protections. The Court has held, for example, that
while states are amenable to suits between each other, they retain
their traditional sovereign immunity against a suit by an Indian
417
tribe. Also, while Congress’s Indian commerce power is broader
than its general commerce power, the Court has found that neither
provision allows the federal government to abrogate the states’
418
Eleventh Amendment privileges.
A recent case has even found that states have an overriding
interest in maintaining their jurisdiction over their territory. A
lawsuit against a state for declaratory or injunctive relief may normally be brought in federal court. However, in Idaho v. Coeur

414. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
415. See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Hobby, 221
F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (welfare); Natonabah v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp.
716 (D.N.M. 1973) (public education).
416. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2367 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
417. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
418. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
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419
d’Alene Tribe, the Supreme Court held that suits to establish
tribal jurisdiction over an area implicate state sovereignty to such a
420
degree that they may be brought only in state court. In another
case decided a few days later, the Court also remarked that the
Constitution’s guarantee against an involuntary reduction in a
421
state’s territory is an “inviolable” aspect of state sovereignty.
The general course of the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence has been that Congress’s power over Indians, while plenary,
is limited by states’ rights. This principle distinguishes United
422
423
States v. McBratney and United States v. Kagama, two key Indian cases from the 1880s. In Kagama, the court upheld federal ju424
risdiction over a crime on an Indian reservation, but in McBrat425
The difference between the
ney, such jurisdiction was denied.
two cases is that in McBratney, the prosecution could have been
sustained only if the area in question was Indian country, which at
426
Since
the time was defined as an absence of state authority.
there had been no state consent, there could be no suspension of
427
state jurisdiction, any treaty to the contrary notwithstanding.
Kagama confirmed that Congress has broad powers for Indian affairs, but McBratney demonstrates that those powers remain limited by state sovereignty.
Aspects of the equal footing doctrine have also been enforced
in the Supreme Court’s recent Indian cases. In Montana v. United
428
States, in addition to the issue of homesteader lands, the court
addressed whether the tribe or the state had authority over a navigable river within the Crow reservation. The Court applied the
equal footing doctrine to find jurisdiction in the state. The fact
that a treaty with the tribe had set the area aside for exclusive Indian use, and that Montana had ceded jurisdiction over Indian
lands, was not enough to overcome the presumption that a state
acquires ownership of navigable rivers within its borders at state429
hood.

419. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
420. See id. at 2040; see also id. at 2044 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
421. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison)).
422. 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
423. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
424. See id. at 384-85.
425. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
429. See id. at 551-54. In Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968), the Court was also presented with a state’s equal footing challenge to the
exclusion of its authority over Indian lands. In that case, however, it was able to
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Some of the Court’s modern cases even continue to look to
statehood enabling legislation to define the scope of tribal sovereignty. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,430 a tribe challenged
state taxation of its activities on IRA lands that were outside of its
reservation. Treaties with the federal government had provided
that tribal lands would remain “exclusively under the laws, juris431
However, the
diction, and government of the United States.”
432
New Mexico Statehood Act allowed the state to tax in any area
433
outside of a reservation. The court upheld the application of the
434
It found that the
state’s business tax on non-reservation lands.
treaty and its tax guarantees “‘do[] not alter the obvious effect of
435
the State’s admission legislation.’”
Other cases from the 1970s also relied on statehood enabling
436
In more recent years,
legislation to define state jurisdiction.
however, the court’s approach has been that announced in the
437
Oklahoma Tax Commission trilogy : the boundary between state
and tribal sovereignty is set by 18 U.S.C. § 1151. These decisions
did not require the court to grapple with the troubling issues posed
by the use of “Indian country” to displace state authority. All of
them involved lands that had been properly set aside and excepted
out of the state’s jurisdiction. So far, no case before the high court
has presented a situation where a finding of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 Indian country would recreate a reservation that had been explicitly
terminated by Congress, or would unilaterally withdraw a state’s
sovereignty over an enormous expanse of its territory. But all this
is about to change with Alaska. No example better demonstrates
the unsoundness of the Supreme Court’s current Indian country
jurisprudence.

find that the state’s legislature had consented to the reestablishment of tribal sovereignty over the area in question. See id. at 411 n.12.
430. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
431. Id. at 150 n.5.
432. The Enabling Act for New Mexico, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
433. See Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 149.
434. See id. at 157-58.
435. Id. at 150 n.5 (quoting Treaty with the Apaches, July 1, 1852, U.S.-Apache
10 Stat. 979). The court found, however, that state taxation of the land itself or
permanent improvements thereon was specifically preempted by the IRA. See id.
at 158.
436. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1978);
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 167 (1973).
437. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995);
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1990).
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IV. THERE IS NO “INDIAN COUNTRY” IN ALASKA
All tribal sovereignty in Alaska other than in Metlakatla was
extinguished by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
438
The reservations created during territorial days
(“ANCSA”).
had been excepted out of the state’s jurisdiction when Alaska was
439
But with the exception of the
admitted to the Union in 1959.
Annette Island Reserve in Metlakatla, ANCSA terminated them
all.
As its name suggests, ANCSA was intended to settle the aboriginal claims of Alaskan Natives. It made the Natives shareholders in a series of state-chartered corporations, and gave the corpo440
rations $962.5 million in cash and forty-four million acres of land.
ANCSA also extinguished all bases of tribal sovereignty. Sections
1603(b) and (c) abrogate Indian title and statutory and treaty
rights. They provide that
(b) All aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of aboriginal title in
Alaska based on use and occupancy, . . . including any aboriginal
hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are hereby extinguished.
(c) All claims against the United States, the State, and all
other persons that are based on claims of aboriginal right, title,
use, or occupancy of land or water areas in Alaska, or that are
based on any statute or treaty of the United States relating to
Native use and occupancy, or that are based on the laws of any
441
other nation, . . . are hereby extinguished.

ANCSA section 1618(a) terminates all of the reservations in
Alaska except for Metlakatla. It provides that “the various reserves set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order
for Native use or for administration of Native affairs . . . are hereby
revoked. This section shall not apply to the Annette Island Re442
serve.”
The effect of these provisions is unambiguous. Their language
is indistinguishable from that of statutes that the Supreme Court
has found to express a clear intent to extinguish tribal sovereignty.
443
Consider, for example, DeCoteau v. District County Court, which
held that state law had attached to parts of the Lake Traverse res444
ervation in South Dakota. The court relied on language provid-

438. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629 (1994)).
439. See COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 743-44; Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
440. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607.
441. Id. § 1603(b)-(c).
442. Id. § 1618(a).
443. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
444. See id. at 449.
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ing that the tribe surrendered its “claim, right, title and interest” to
the area in question.445 Compare this with ANCSA section 1603(c),
which extinguishes Native claims based on “aboriginal right, title,
446
use, or occupancy.”
ANCSA took the lands occupied by Natives in Alaska, revoked any aboriginal claim to them, and reconveyed them to Natives as private owners in fee simple absolute. The language employed by ANCSA is a term of art that has been understood to
extinguish tribal sovereignty since John Marshall’s time. Aboriginal government is displaced by state authority when the federal
447
government “‘extinguish[es] . . . the Indian title to [the] lands.’”
The inescapability of the conclusion that ANCSA terminates
Indian government is brought into relief by the opinions of those
Supreme Court Justices who have been more hesitant to extinguish
448
tribal sovereignty. In Hagen v. Utah, a majority held that state
449
jurisdiction had attached to the Uintah reservation in Utah. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that the legislation at issue was
450
too weak for the Court to infer an intent to diminish.
What is interesting is the type of statutory language that Justice Blackmun held up in contrast. He cited as “express language
of geographical termination” past federal statutes providing that a
reservation was “discontinued” or that its lines were “hereby
451
Justice Blackmun thus implied that such language
abolished.”
would supply the necessary expression of clear federal intent to
452
terminate Indian government. Absent a legally cognizable distinction between “discontinued” or “abolished” and ANCSA section 1618(a)’s statement that all reservations are “revoked,” it is
445. Id. at 445-46; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 591 n.8
(1977) (finding intent to terminate in conveyance of all “claim, right, title and interest”).
446. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(c).
447. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring)
(quoting the Georgia Compact of 1802); see also Trade and Intercourse Act of
1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (defining Indian country as all land outside of any
state “to which the Indian title has not been extinguished”); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 769 (1866) (finding that the state has no tax jurisdiction
until “the Indian title should be extinguished”); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209
(1877) (stating that land “ceases to be Indian country when [the Indians] lose
[their] title”).
448. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
449. See id. at 421-22.
450. See id. at 423-24.
451. Id. at 427 n.7 (citing Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 248, 15 Stat. 198, 221
(“the . . . reservation is hereby discontinued”); Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33
Stat. 189, 218).
452. See id.
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fair to infer that even former Justice Blackmun would agree that
ANCSA extinguishes tribal sovereignty in Alaska.
The architects of ANCSA were not insensitive to the need for
local government in rural Native areas of Alaska. Section
1613(c)(3) of the Act provides that each village corporation will
convey a parcel of land either to an existing municipal government,
453
or to the State of Alaska in trust for a future municipality. Congress intended that rural Alaskan Natives would govern themselves, but within the confines of state law.
Other aspects of ANCSA confirm its terminationist bent. The
corporate model it adopts was also employed in some of the termi454
ANCSA even reflects the Supreme
nation acts of the 1950s.
Court’s construction of the termination acts. In Menominee Tribe
455
v. United States, which was decided three years before ANCSA
was enacted, the Court interpreted the Menominee Termination
Act of 1954. That statute provides that state laws will apply to the
Menominee Indians “in the same manner as they apply to other
456
citizens or persons” within the state’s jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court found this language insufficient to allow Wisconsin to regu457
late Indian hunting and fishing. The ANCSA drafters, undoubtedly aware of Menominee, were careful to avoid such a result for
Alaska. They specifically extinguished all aboriginal rights,
“including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may ex458
ist.”
But it is not necessary to look to the structure of ANCSA or
parallel legislation to discern its effect. Its termination provisions
leave nothing to the imagination. ANCSA employs language
which, from the beginning of the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence, has been understood to extinguish tribal sovereignty and
459
ANCSA definitively answers the
invite state jurisdiction.
453. See 43 U.S.C. § 1613(c)(3) (1994).
454. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 132-40
(1972); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408-10 (1968).
455. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
456. Id. at 410.
457. See id. at 412-13.
458. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
459. Not every authority to consider this subject concurs in this conclusion.
Two recent law review articles take the position that Alaskan Native villages are
separate sovereigns. See David M. Blurton, ANCSA Corporation Lands and the
Dependent Indian Community Category of Indian Country, 13 ALASKA L. REV.
211 (1996); Gretchen G. Biggs, Comment, Is There Indian Country in Alaska?
Forty-four Million Acres in Legal Limbo, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1993). Both
authors contend that because ANCSA is very complex, its effect on tribal sovereignty is ambiguous, and this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of tribal sovereignty. See also COHEN 1982, supra note 26, at 766.
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“Indian country” question for Alaska.460 Subsequent federal enactments and executive orders do not alter this result. Once
Alaska acquired full jurisdiction over its former Indian enclaves,
that jurisdiction could not be retracted without the state’s consent,
and no such consent has been granted.
A. Venetie II’s Relaxed Standard
Yet in Venetie II, the Ninth Circuit was able to find that the
same reservation ANCSA had discontinued in 1971 is still an is461
Relying on 18
land of exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction.
U.S.C. § 1151, the court effectively reversed Congress’s previous
462
decision to terminate the reservation. Venetie II represents a deviation from the approach followed by other circuits. The test it
crafts recognizes tribal sovereignty more readily than would any
other court’s standard. Nevertheless, it remains a colorable construction of the federal Indian country statute. The Ninth Circuit
merely reinterpreted a test that has never been spelled out in detail
463
by the Supreme Court. While some aspects of the decision are
questionable, these are matters on which reasonable minds could
disagree. Venetie II cannot be dismissed as one court’s folly.
Rather, the decision is a wake-up call to the contradictions of relying on “Indian country” to define sovereignty.
Another commentator argues that Alaska Natives have never been sovereign. See Paul A. Matteoni, Comment, Alaskan Native Indian Villages: The
Question of Sovereign Rights, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 875 (1988). The author
bases this conclusion on a finding that Alaska Natives do not meet the traditional
historical and legal criteria for tribal status. See id. at 891. This conclusion is implausible in light of the sovereignty that Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60 (1962), recognized to exist before ANCSA, not to mention before Columbus. See id. at 67-68.
460. “Indian country” as defined in this Article could still exist within a state in
the absence of tribal sovereignty, since the term only implies federal criminal and
liquor jurisdiction. However, this jurisdiction was transferred to some of the
states by Public Law 280. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4, 67
Stat. 588, 589. This law was extended to Alaska in 1958. See Act of Aug. 8, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545, 545 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 730, 733 &
n.17 (1983) (liquor jurisdiction); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 380 & n.6
(1976) (criminal jurisdiction).
461. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t (Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1302 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 2478 (1997).
462. See id. at 1293.
463. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. Max, 11 Ind. Rptr. 6038, 6041
(Siss.-Wahptn. Sioux Tribal Ct. 1984) (noting “sparse case law exists which lends
only vague guidance as to the meaning of the phrase [‘dependent Indian community’]”).
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The federal Indian country statute, particularly its “dependent
Indian communities”464 test, has had a tortured history in the lower
465
That standard has not been clarified by the Supreme
courts.
Court since it was first established in Sandoval and McGowan.
Today, there are fifteen federal court of appeals opinions that apply the dependent communities test, mostly from the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits. The first effort at judicial construction came in
466
The Tenth Circuit held that
1971, in United States v. Martine.
whether an area is dependent community Indian country will turn
on three factors: the nature of the area in question, the relationship
of the inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal
government, and the established practice of government agencies
467
toward the area.
Ten years later, the Eighth Circuit took all three factors in the
Martine inquiry and made them into the second element of its own
468
four-part test. United States v. South Dakota looks to (1)
whether the United States has retained title to the lands and
authority over the area; (2) the Martine test; (3) whether there is
cohesiveness among the inhabitants of the area; and (4) whether
the lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and protec469
tion of Indians. The Tenth Circuit subsequently traded Martine
470
for South Dakota’s four-part test. The First Circuit has created
471
its own hybrid of the Martine and South Dakota inquiries. The
472
Several state
Second Circuit has adopted the Martine test.
473
courts, meanwhile, have developed entirely different tests.

464. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
465. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 11 Ind. Rptr. at 6040 (noting that
courts have “not [been] able to agree on a consistent construction of Indian country”).
466. 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
467. See id. at 1023.
468. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981).
469. See id. at 839.
470. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531,
1545 (10th Cir. 1995).
471. See Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Elec. Co.,
89 F.3d 908, 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1996) (relying on South Dakota but emphasizing
federal ownership).
472. See United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1991) (adopting Martine); United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying Martine).
473. See, e.g., Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Conn., Inc. v. Potter, 587 A.2d
139, 144 (Conn. 1991); State v. St. Francis, 563 A.2d 249 (Vt. 1989); Maryland v.
Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 562 (Me. 1979); see also Seminole Nation v. Harjo, 790 P.2d
1098, 1100-01 (Okla. 1990) (following South Dakota and Martine).
Tribal courts generally have followed the test employed in their local federal circuit. See, e.g. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. Feather, 15 Ind. Rptr.
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The Ninth Circuit has also followed its own course. On its
face, Venetie II’s six-part inquiry is no more than a combination of
South Dakota and Martine. The test looks at (1) the nature of the
area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to Indian tribes
and the federal government; (3) the established practice of government agencies to the area; (4) the degree of federal ownership
and control over the area; (5) the degree of cohesiveness of the
area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area was set aside
474
for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indians.
Stated as such, the Ninth Circuit’s standard appears little different
from South Dakota. The real proof of the test, however, is in the
way it has been applied.
In the Venetie II decision, the only meaningful element of the
entire six-part test proved to be the first factor. The court asked
whether the Natives have a special use and occupancy relationship
475
The Ninth Circuit found this
with a reasonably definable area.
requirement to be satisfied if the Natives are the dominant popula476
tion in an area and if they live off the land to some extent.
The second and third elements of the test would appear to be
important requirements. They focus on the federal government’s
477
relationship with the area and its inhabitants. However, the evidence relied on in Venetie II indicates this inquiry is not a meaningful threshold. The court first looked to the fact that the federal
478
Bureau of Indian Affairs at one time ran the schools in Venetie.
After ANCSA’s termination of the reservation, however, school
administration eventually reverted to the State of Alaska. The
panel’s main evidence of federal superintendence was a federal
program that no longer exists.
The court also relied on the fact that the federal government
has provided grants for various projects and public works in Vene479
tie. While these programs were not affected by ANCSA, it is difficult to see how they distinguish Venetie from many non-Indian
communities in America. The only other evidence cited by the
panel is that Venetie is registered as an Indian tribe under the 1936
480
amendments to the IRA. The Venetie II opinion concedes that
6027, 6028 (Intertrb. Ct. App. 1988) (applying South Dakota).
474. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov’t (Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1294 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
2478 (1997). Factors (1)-(3) are the Martine test and (4)-(6) are the additional
South Dakota factors.
475. See id. at 1300.
476. See id.
477. See id. at 1294.
478. See id. at 1300.
479. See id. at 1301.
480. See id. at 1300.
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after ANCSA was enacted, “[i]n many respects, the federal government has been replaced by the State or the Tribe itself as the
direct provider of services.”481 The court nevertheless concluded
that there was adequate federal superintendence to establish tribal
482
sovereignty in Venetie.
The Ninth Circuit’s fourth Indian country factor looks to the
degree of federal ownership and control over the area in ques483
tion. The Venetie Natives’ land is not owned by the federal gov484
ernment and there are no restrictions on its sale. The panel nev485
ertheless decided this element of the test had been met. It relied
on the same evidence that satisfied the second and third ele486
The fifth element, cohesiveness, was satisfied by the
ments.
lower court’s finding of a history of collective action among the
487
The sixth element, whether the land is set
Natives of Venetie.
aside for the use and occupancy of Natives, was automatically sat488
isfied by ANCSA. The court found that ANCSA corporations,
489
“while business entities, maintain a distinctly Native identity.”
Venetie II divorces the test for tribal sovereignty from any requirement that Congress intended to recognize the tribe as a sovereign. Federal legislation that deals with Indians as private parties can establish “Indian country” under this standard simply
because it deals with Natives as such. The Venetie II test primarily
turns on Indian ancestry. Most areas with a predominantly Native
population could qualify as a separate jurisdiction under its sixpart inquiry. Only minimal evidence of federal involvement is required, there is no need for federal ownership or control of the
land, and even a terminationist statute can help prove the land has
been set aside for Natives. The fact that Congress has specifically
revoked an Indian reservation is irrelevant. Probably any tribe
that occupies a definable area could secede from its state under
Venetie II.
B. Venetie IRA: Toward Personal Sovereignty?
The nature of the courts’ emerging approach to Indian sovereignty is best exemplified by another decision in the ongoing Ve-

481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

Id. at 1301.
See id. at 1302.
See id. at 1294.
See id. at 1301.
See id.
See id. at 1300-01.
See id. at 1301.
See id. at 1301-02.
Id. at 1302.
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netie litigation, Venetie IRA.490 Venetie II had addressed whether
the tribal council could tax the State of Alaska’s contractor for
491
building a schoolhouse in the village. Venetie IRA involves adop492
tions and welfare. The tribe claimed it had the authority to issue
adoption decrees that determine how the state allocates welfare
493
494
payments. The federal courts agreed.
The most surprising aspect of Venetie IRA is its holding that
all tribes have inherent powers that displace state authority, re495
gardless of whether the tribe is located in Indian country. Venetie IRA specifically declares that “tribal sovereignty is not cotermi496
nous with Indian country.” Even if no borders exist that would
define jurisdiction, a tribe retains powers that are “manifested
497
As the court’s decision
primarily over the tribe’s members.”
demonstrates, this residual authority may even bind the state. The
principal question for Indian sovereignty thus becomes whether a
group of Indians constitutes a tribe.
Venetie IRA’s standard for tribal status is minimal. An association of Indians is a tribe if it has “some connection beyond total
assimilation” to an entity that “historically acted as [a] bod[y] poli498
tic, particularly in periods prior to subjugation by non-natives.”
Basically, any identifiable remnant of an Indian tribe can meet this
test. On remand from Venetie IRA, the district court found that
the Venetie Natives are a tribe because their ancestors came to499
gether to build fences to trap caribou. The court noted that “the
cooperation and effort of the men, women, and children from
many families was required to construct, use, and maintain the
500
fences.” On this basis, the courts found that the village council
501
has sovereign powers that displace state authority.
There is no Supreme Court authority that supports Venetie
IRA’s approach to tribal sovereignty. The Court has never recog490. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska (Venetie IRA), 944
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
491. See Venetie II, 101 F.3d at 1289.
492. See Venetie IRA, 944 F.2d at 551.
493. See id.
494. See id. at 562.
495. See id. at 556 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 564 (1981)).
496. Id. at 558 n.12.
497. Id.
498. Id. at 557.
499. See Native Village of Venetie v. State, Nos. F86-0075 CIV (HRH), F870051 CIV (HRH), 1994 WL 730893, at *15 (D. Alaska Dec. 23, 1994).
500. Id.
501. See id. at *22.
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nized independent Indian government in the absence of some geographical base. Indeed, it has even held that when a tribe does
have jurisdiction over a particular area, Indian sovereignty does
not extend beyond that area.502 The “membership sovereignty” envisioned by Venetie IRA, in which Natives carry their sovereignty
with them wherever they go, simply has no basis in federal Indian
law.
To the extent the Supreme Court has focused on tribal membership to define tribal powers, it has done so within tribal territory. Thus it has held that tribal criminal jurisdiction on the reser503
vation is restricted to tribal members, that states may tax
504
reservation sales to non-members, and that members have im505
In these
munity from state-imposed taxes on the reservation.
cases, membership was a prerequisite to Indian sovereignty, in addition to the existence of tribal territory. Every single decision Venetie IRA cites for its principle of membership sovereignty is a case
506
that involved activities within a continuing Indian reservation. In
no way do these precedents suggest that a tribe may displace state
authority outside of tribal territory.
Two of the cases quoted in Venetie IRA involve Montana
507
lands. As discussed in Part III.C, these are parcels within a reservation that have been transferred to outsiders. In Montana v.
United States, the Supreme Court decided that these lands are no
508
longer subject to full tribal authority. However, the Court made
a concession to the practical need of tribal governments to control

502. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973)
(“Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation
boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state.”).
503. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
504. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
505. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
506. The panel relied on Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (addressing the
Salt River Indian Reservation); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (addressing the Yakima Indian Reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (addressing the Crow
Indian Reservation); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980) (addressing the Fort Apache Indian Reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (addressing
the Colville Indian Reservation); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
(addressing the Navajo Indian Reservation). See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A.
Council v. Alaska (Venetie IRA), 944 F.2d 548, 556 n.9, 558 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991).
507. See Venetie IRA, 944 F.2d at 556, 558 n.12 (quoting Brendale and Montana
for the standard for retained tribal power over non-Indian lands within a reservation).
508. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
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some activities on these pockets within their territory.509 As suggested by Montana and subsequent cases, this retained authority
includes jurisdiction over tribal members who venture into these
510
Within the boundaries of a continuing reservation, the
areas.
tribe has power over its members, regardless of non-Indian owner511
ship of particular parcels.
Venetie IRA apparently interpreted
these statements to mean that tribes always have power over their
members, regardless of any jurisdictional borders. The Ninth Circuit took the rule applicable to non-Indian lots within a reservation
and extended its application to the entire United States.
Venetie IRA presents an administrative nightmare for the
state of Alaska. There are no geographical borders to the tribal
authority it recognizes and no case law that defines the nature of
“membership sovereignty.” The decision requires the state to
compete with potentially hundreds of independent entities for
governmental authority within Alaska. It strips local officials of
their presumptive jurisdiction, not just within a fixed geographical
area, but in any case involving tribal Indians. Tribal regulation can
preempt state law and may even bind state decisionmakers. The
precise allocation of authority can be known only through further
litigation. In many ways, the Venetie IRA decision is more troubling than Venetie II.
Unfortunately, the state of Alaska did not appeal Venetie IRA
It may have believed that only the finding of tribal status could be
challenged, not the ruling that sovereign powers flow from such
status. While the state was preparing its case, a new administration
in Washington, D.C. appointed Indian sovereignty advocates to
512
the helm of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). In October
1993, the BIA published a notice in the Federal Register designating all of Alaska’s tribes as federally recognized Indian tribes.
The state apparently concluded it no longer had a case and abandoned its appeal.
The BIA’s 1993 notice does not recognize Alaska’s tribes simply for purposes of distributing federal aid. Rather, it claims to afford them “status as Indian tribes with a government-to513
They are to
government relationship with the United States.”
“have the right, subject to general principles of [f]ederal Indian
law, to exercise the same inherent and delegated authorities avail509. See id. at 565.
510. See id. at 563-65.
511. See id.
512. See, e.g., Nomination of Ada Deer: Hearing on the Nomination of Ada Deer
to be Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 9 (1993).
513. Tribal Recognition Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,366 (1993).
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able to other tribes.” 514 In short, the BIA notice designates
Alaska’s tribes as “political entities exercising governmental
515
authority.” A list appended to the end of the notice extends this
516
sovereign status to 224 Native entities in Alaska. Some of these
517
groups are located in villages with a population of fewer than ten.
The BIA’s actions are truly remarkable. The agency purports,
by sheer administrative edict, to make independent nations of literally hundreds of Native organizations in Alaska. The BIA would
vest each of these groups with the same governmental power and
immunity from state law enjoyed by a tribe on a continuing Indian
reservation. The notice even hints that the tribes can exercise ju518
risdiction over non-Natives. In effect, the BIA claims the sovereign authority appropriated to the state of Alaska and reallocates
it to other entities.
The BIA’s actions would clearly exceed its delegated authority had not Congress retroactively validated those actions in the
519
Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994. That legislation mirrors the language of the BIA notice, announcing that the
United States “maintains a government to government relationship with [the recognized] tribes, and recognizes [their] sover520
eignty.”
Nothing in the tribal sovereignty doctrine authorizes such a
decree. The Supreme Court has indicated that even Congress cannot simply assign sovereignty to a separate organization within a
state. The Court has upheld transfers of federal power to Indians,
but only where the tribe already possesses “independent authority
521
over the subject matter.” The tribe must be a pre-existing sover522
eign, one of the “Indian tribes within ‘Indian country.’” The Supreme Court has never held that a tribe within a state is automatically sovereign by virtue of its members’ common descent from a
514. Id.
515. Id. at 54,365.
516. See id. at 54,366-68.
517. The village of Telida has a population of nine; Council, eight; Portage
Creek, six; Ugashik, five. See THE ALASKA ALMANAC 174, 179, 180 (1996 ed.).
Many other villages on the BIA’s list have populations of less than 50. These figures include non-Natives.
518. See Tribal Recognition Notice, 58 Fed. Reg. at 54,366 n.1. By contrast,
Venetie IRA only allows a tribe outside of Indian country to exercise governmental authority over its own members. See Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council
v. Alaska (Venetie IRA), 944 F.2d 548, 558 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991).
519. See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
520. Id.
521. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-322 (1936)).
522. Id.
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historical tribe.523 Sovereignty always has turned on the existence
of a jurisdictional enclave, on the residency of the tribe within
“Indian country.” No principle of Indian law allows the federal
government to delegate general police powers that Congress itself
does not possess, or to otherwise confer sovereign authority on
state Indians.
Neither Venetie IRA nor the BIA’s actions can claim legitimation in the Supreme Court’s Indian jurisprudence. The current
doctrine does not acknowledge the concept of “membership sovereignty.” Nevertheless, a family resemblance cannot be denied.
Once the 1975 DeCoteau decision held that Indian sovereignty
could exist without an affirmative cession of authority by the state,
the rules for tribal government lost their connection to general
principles of jurisdiction and federalism. Today, the Oklahoma
Tax Commission trilogy continues to insist on some degree of federal involvement for tribal sovereignty. Normally, though, federal
aid to a group of people will not make them a separate nation.
Some other factor must be at work here. But if constitutional rules
of state sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction do not operate, then
the special governmental status of Indians must arise solely from
the fact that they are Indians. The only irreducible component of
the current test for tribal sovereignty is Indian ancestry.
Venetie IRA and Venetie II are exceptional only in that they
set a low threshold for the degree of federal involvement necessary
to find tribal sovereignty. Many tribes are recognized under the
IRA for purposes of receiving federal assistance. This recognition
alone probably would satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s test. As untenable
as this approach may seem, nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions bars the courts from creating Indian sovereigns on the
basis of such minimal federal participation. Since the Constitution’s limits on the reallocation of state jurisdiction do not seem to
apply, only the fact of a tribe’s existence is an absolute requirement for it to secede from a state. In the Venetie cases, Felix Cohen’s vision for federal Indian law has finally arrived. American
Indians have become personal sovereigns.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has always recognized a power in Congress to legislate for Indians as such. But until recently, this power
was limited by principles of state sovereignty. The federal government could not unilaterally extinguish a state’s jurisdiction or

523. Indeed, it has indicated that tribes entirely within a state’s jurisdiction are
little more than “‘private, voluntary organizations.’” Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373, 388 (1976) (quoting Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557).
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otherwise ignore states’ rights. Today, these limitations have been
forgotten. In the mispursuit of congressional intent, the courts
have construed the federal Indian country statute to appropriate
state authority and to reallocate it to tribal entities.
Eventually, the Supreme Court must confront the contradictions in its jurisprudence. It will have to decide whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 reverses the work of subsequent termination statutes, and if
Indian housing projects really are sovereign nations. More immediately, it must decide whether Alaska is to lose control of fortyfour million acres of territory.
The Supreme Court should realign its Indian country decisions with the Constitution’s limits on federal power. This does
not require abandoning the federal trust relationship with the
tribes. Protective legislation for Indian country remains within
Congress’s broad authority. The current statute should be read to
apply wherever the federal government has set aside land for Indians and replaces the state as public superintendent. However,
“Indian country” should not be understood to preempt all state
law or establish a separate nation. This should occur only where
the state has affirmatively ceded its jurisdiction.
The creation of tribal sovereignty on the sole basis of 18
U.S.C. § 1151 is neither intended by that statute nor consistent
with the Constitution. The unique history of Indians within the nation entitles them to the special consideration of the United States.
But it does not replace the Constitution’s framework of government. Where current conditions prefer such a result, the tribes
that were excepted out of the American polity should continue as
independent nations. But the courts should never presume, on the
sole basis of their ancestry, that American Indians must always be
regarded as separate sovereigns within our nation.

